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INTRODUCTION

I
D
T
O
W
I

n 2017, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Stephen
O’Brien told the Security Council, “we are facing the largest humanitarian
crisis since the creation of the United Nations . . . more than 20 million
people across four countries [Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan, and Nigeria]
face starvation and famine.”1 All four crises were produced by armed conflict, and, in particular, the resurgent use of starvation as a method of warfare.2 At the heart of perhaps the most devastating was the Saudi- and
Emirati-led coalition’s de facto naval blockade of Yemen.3 U.N. humanitarian coordinator Lise Grande warned in late 2018 that the country was facing
the world’s worst famine in a century.4 Even as food was allowed in, the
1. Associated Press, World Faces Worst Humanitarian Crisis since 1945, says UN Official,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/11/worldfaces-worst-humanitarian-crisis-since-1945-says-un-official. Alex de Waal describes
O’Brien’s framing as “hyperbolic” but agreed that “2017 marks a critical turning point, a
moment at which famine could return.” ALEX DE WAAL, MASS STARVATION: THE HISTORY
AND FUTURE OF FAMINE 179 (2018). On the role of armed conflict, and particularly the use
of starvation as a method of warfare, in precipitating these crises, see FOOD SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK, 2018 GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES (2018),
https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000069227/download/?_ga=2.155628472.
2098461776.1600107968-1595877267.1600107968 [hereinafter 2018 GLOBAL REPORT ON
FOOD CRISES]; U.N. Secretary-General’s Joint Press Conference on Humanitarian Crises in
Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.un.org/
sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2017-02-22/full-transcript-secretary-generals-jointpress-conference.
2. 2018 GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES, supra note 1; U.N. Secretary-General’s
Joint Press Conference, supra note 1. On the resurgence of famine as a consequence of
deliberate policy, see DE WAAL, MASS STARVATION. supra note 1, at 6–7. For earlier iterations
of the claim that famine is caused by political choices, see ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES:
POLITICS AND THE DISASTER RELIEF INDUSTRY IN AFRICA 7 (1997); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 160, 175 (1999); David Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law,
97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245, 245 (2003).
3. It is not clear whether or for how long the naval encirclement of Yemen has qualified
as a blockade in the strict sense, because there is ambiguity regarding whether the concept
exists in non-international armed conflicts, enforcement has occurred within Yemen’s territorial sea, and for the most part the preclusion of ingress and egress has not been comprehensive. Martin D. Fink, Naval Blockade and the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen, 64 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 291, 297–303 (2017).
4. Hannah Summers, Yemen on Brink of ‘World's Worst Famine in 100 Years’ if War Continues, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
2018/oct/15/yemen-on-brink-worst-famine-100-years-un.
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blockade limited the quantity, delayed, and otherwise impeded its delivery,
caused dramatic spikes in prices, and devastated the economy and thus the
capacity of most people in the country to pay those prices.5 A few months
after Grande’s warning, World Food Programme spokesperson Herve Verhoosel claimed that approximately ten million Yemenis were “one step away
from famine.”6 Aid operations delayed devastation on that scale, but the consequence of the longstanding deprivation is that the population is now
uniquely vulnerable to the gravest ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic. 7 Recent cuts to essential aid have further exacerbated the crisis.8
In the last century, the law of armed conflict and other relevant regimes
have transitioned from permitting the starvation of the civilian population in
war with little restraint, to weakly regulating it, subsequently prohibiting it,
and ultimately classifying the starvation of the civilian population as a war
crime and a core object of concern for the U.N. Security Council.9 Despite
its recent resurgence in practice, as a matter of law, the starvation of civilians
has gone from being accepted as a purportedly humane method of warfare
to a being condemned as gravely wrongful and identified as a reason for
global scrutiny and action. Nonetheless, the boundaries of many of these
legal developments have yet to be tested or clearly defined. The nature and
scope of their applicability to naval blockades in particular remain the subject
of debate and confusion.
A unique opportunity exists to bring clarity to this issue. Under the auspices of the Institute for International Humanitarian Law, an international
group of experts has started to deliberate on an update to the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea. The original Manual
5. Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, Situation of Human
Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses since September 2014, ¶¶ 768–71, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/42/CRP.1* (Sept. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Group of Experts on Yemen]; Jane Ferguson, Is Intentional Starvation the Future of War?, NEW YORKER (July 11, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/is-yemen-intentional-starvation-the-future-of-war.
6. 10 Million Yemenis ‘One Step Away from Famine,’ UN Food Agency Calls for ‘Unhindered
Access’ To Frontline Regions, UN NEWS (Mar. 26, 2019), https://news.un.org/
en/story/2019/03/1035501.
7. Richard Stone, Yemen Was Facing the World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis. Then the Coronavirus Hit, SCIENCE (May 28, 2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/05/yemenwas-facing-worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-then-coronavirus-hit.
8. Vivian Yee, Yemen Aid Falls Short, Threatening Food and Health Programs, NEW YORK
TIMES (June 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/world/middleeast/yemensaudi-united-nations-aid.html.
9. See Part II infra.
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was adopted in 1994, after six years of similar expert discussions and consultations, and published with a formal “Explanation” the following year. 10
Much like later efforts to restate the customary international law applicable
to air warfare and cyber warfare, it provides an important first port of call
for any lawyer working in a domain covered only incompletely by existing
treaty law.11 An effort to develop an analogous text for military operations
in space is ongoing.12
Much of the discussion in the update process is likely to focus on addressing the profound technological change that has occurred in the quartercentury since the publication of the first edition. Developments in the realms
of cyberspace, machine learning, and vessel and weapon system autonomy
raise legal questions that were beyond the comprehension of the original
drafters. There are questions that must be confronted as the new group of
experts contemplates how to articulate the principles and commentaries
upon which legal advisers, scholars, and analysts will draw when evaluating
naval conflicts in the coming years and decades.
However, at least as important are the more fundamental tasks of interrogating the original rules on their own terms and adapting the text to normative developments in the period since publication. If pursued rigorously,
revisions arising from these latter projects may well eclipse those responding
to technological change. To that end, this article engages in a reevaluation of
the San Remo rules on the deprivation of objects essential to survival, which
are included in the Manual’s framework for the regulation of blockade warfare. The San Remo rules go beyond previous articulations of the law of
blockade in identifying humanitarian restrictions on the practice. However,
the fact of those restrictions obscures a surprisingly permissive posture on
starvation blockades. It is a posture that is objectionable both on its own
terms and in light of legal and normative developments since the Manual’s
adoption. In advocating significantly tighter humanitarian constraints, this
10. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SRM].
11. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009) [hereinafter HPCR MANUAL]; TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013); TALLINN MANUAL
2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt
gen. ed., 2017).
12. On the effort to draft the Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military
Space Operations, see The Woomera Manual, UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE, https://law.adelaide.edu.au/woomera/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2021).
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article responds directly to recent efforts on the pages of this Journal to defend the legality of intentional starvation in blockades and other encirclements. 13 At a moment when the proscription of such tactics is tightening, it
is vital that this progress is recognized in the San Remo update.
The argument proceeds in five Parts. Part II provides a brief history of
the trajectory of international humanitarian law (IHL) on encirclement, the
deprivation of essentials, and humanitarian access. Part III exposes the weaknesses and contradictions in the key humanitarian provisions on the law of
blockade, as articulated in the San Remo Manual. Part IV identifies the legal
and policy arguments offered in favor of a permissive law of blockade—
perhaps one even more permissive than that articulated in the original edition of the San Remo Manual. Part V rebuts those arguments, presenting the
legal and moral case for strengthening the humanitarian restrictions on
blockades in the revised edition. Part VI identifies two macro trends that
demand the detailed attention of those charged with updating the Manual,
both on the specific issue of blockades, but also across the Manual as a whole,
namely: the expansion of IHL rules applicable to non-international armed
conflicts (NIACs) and the now widespread recognition of the applicability
of international human rights law (IHRL) in armed conflict.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAW OF ENCIRCLEMENT, DEPRIVATION,
AND HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

For much of the modern history of war, starvation tactics were deemed to
be a necessary and thus permissible method of warfare. 14 Hugo Grotius and
Emer de Vattel both considered and affirmed the use of hunger as a weapon
in their writings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively.15
In the nineteenth century, one of the landmark codification efforts in this

13. Sean Watts, Humanitarian Logic and the Law of Siege: A Study of the Oxford Guidance
on Relief Actions, 94 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1 (2019); Phillip J. Drew, Can We Starve
the Civilians? Exploring the Dichotomy between the Traditional Law of Maritime Blockade and Humanitarian Initiatives, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 302 (2019).
14. Charles A. Allen, Civilian Starvation and Relief During Armed Conflict: The Modern Humanitarian Law, 19 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 1, 31
(1989); Nicholas Mulder & Boyd van Dijk, Why Did Starvation Not Become the Paradigmatic War
Crime in International Law?, in CONTINGENCY AND THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Kevin Jon Heller & Ingo Venzke eds., forthcoming).
15. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE ch. 2, ¶ 10 (1625); 2 EMER
DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS ¶ 112 (1758).
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realm was Francis Lieber’s U.S. General Orders No. 100, drafted on the request of Abraham Lincoln as a framework for regulating both sides of the
American Civil War.16 On the question of the use of hunger as a weapon,
Lieber did not equivocate. Starvation, including of civilians, was permissible
because it could facilitate victory. Article 17 of the Code provides, “it is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the
speedier subjection of the enemy.”17 Article 18 clarifies the claimed importance of including civilians as targets for hunger: “When a commander
of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to lessen the number
of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme
measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the surrender.”18
It was not until several decades after Lieber’s endeavor that States negotiated the first significant multilateral treaties governing the conduct of hostilities at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The Hague Regulations
were attached first to Convention II of 189919 and then, in their updated
form, to Convention IV of 1907.20 Although neither version replicates
Lieber’s overt approval of starvation tactics, the Regulations’ silence on the
issue is itself significant. Starvation is not identified in Article 23 of either
treaty as a method of war that is “especially prohibited.”21 Article 25 of each
prohibits only attack or bombardment (in the 1907 version “by whatever
means”) of undefended localities. 22 And Article 27 provides that in sieges and
bombardments of defended localities, a besieging party must take all necessary steps to spare “buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and

16. U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter General Orders No.
100]. For a comprehensive overview of the code and its relationship to the law of war, see
JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2012).
17. General Orders No. 100, supra note 16, art. 17 (emphasis added).
18. Id. art. 18.
19. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter Hague Regulations 1899].
20. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations 1907].
21. Hague Regulations 1899, supra note 19, art. 23; Hague Regulations 1907, supra note
20, art. 23.
22. Hague Regulations 1899, supra note 19, art. 25; Hague Regulations 1907, supra note
20, art. 25.
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wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.”23 Starvation and other forms of deprivation by encirclement
are left unregulated—a silence that would echo through the courtrooms of
Nuremberg forty years later.
Not long after the Second Hague Conference, and inspired in significant
part by its Twelfth Convention (on the creation of an International Prize
Court), the British government convened a conference of ten naval powers
in London to agree what became the non-binding London Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War (1909).24 In the first twenty-one articles, the
Declaration went far beyond the laconic assertion of an efficacy requirement
in the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law to elaborate and
crystallize many of the key features of blockade law that remain applicable
today.25 These include the principles and derivative rules of efficacy, impartiality, notification, enforcement, and neutrality.26 Notably, however, the
framework included no provisions protecting the encircled civilian population against the potentially severe deprivation that follows from a comprehensive blockade. Under the understanding of the law articulated in the London Declaration, the infliction of mass starvation remained very much within
the blockading party’s authority.
The possible illegality of such methods started to percolate in significant
form in the aftermath of World War I. The parties to the Paris Peace Conference set up a Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War
and on Enforcement of Penalties to investigate the issue of war crimes responsibility during the Great War. In its 1919 report, the Commission listed
“deliberate starvation of civilians” as a violation to which criminal liability

23. Hague Regulations 1899, supra note 19, art. 27; Hague Regulations 1907, supra note
20, art. 27.
24. Declaration Concerning the Laws of Maritime War, Feb. 26, 1909, 208 Consol. T.S.
338, reprinted in THE DECLARATION OF LONDON, FEBRUARY 26, 1909, at 112 (James B.
Scott ed., 1919) [hereinafter Declaration of London].
25. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 15 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 89 (1907) [hereinafter Paris Declaration].
26. Declaration of London, supra note 24, arts. 1–21.
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could attach. 27 However, efforts to establish a system of international criminal accountability after World War I failed, and the Commission’s proposal
regarding starvation was never enacted.28
There was also a dark irony in the inclusion of starvation in the list. As
Nicholas Mulder and Boyd van Dijk recount, “To pressure the Dutch government to extradite the exiled Kaiser” for alleged crimes committed during
the Great War (the very subject of the Commission’s work), “British foreign
secretary Arthur Balfour . . . suggested imposing a blockade of the Netherlands, accepting that the neutral country might have to be starved into submission” to secure the transfer.29 Balfour’s proposal was not implemented,
but restraint in that respect was not for squeamishness as to the consequences. The Allies had engaged in a comprehensive naval blockade of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria during the war
and had “caused hundreds of thousands of deaths” and contributed to a
“major social, economic, and health crisis” by maintaining the blockade after
the armistice in order to pressure Germany to sign the final Peace Treaty.30
After the war, economic blockades were championed as a mechanism
for preventing armed conflict.31 Although preliminary efforts were made
through the League of Nations to conceive of regulations that would limit
their effects on civilian populations, the only constraint agreed upon was that
the interception of food supplies would be used only after other means of
conflict resolution had been exhausted.32 In the law of armed conflict, no
changes were made to the existing treaty regime. When World War II
erupted, the tactic was seen by all parties as very much on the table. The
Nazis distinguished themselves in using starvation not just as a method of
war, but also as a central component of their system of genocidal extermina-

27. Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29, 1919), reprinted in 14 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 114 (1920).
28. On the efforts to pursue criminal justice for alleged German perpetrators after
World War I, see GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS
OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS ch. 3 (2002).
29. Mulder & van Dijk, supra note 14.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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tion and persecution—the infamous “hunger plan” implemented to eliminate “useless eaters.”33 However, every major power weaponized mass hunger in the conduct of hostilities, causing enormous suffering and death.34
In contrast to the failed efforts after the Great War, the Allies were successful in creating a system of criminal justice to be applied to their defeated
adversaries after World War II.35 The flagship of that effort was the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, at which twenty-two of the
most senior Nazi war criminals were tried before a judge each from France,
Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.36 Various acts of starvation
were prosecuted successfully at the IMT as war crimes or crimes against humanity, but those instances involved the starvation of prisoners of war, populations in Nazi-occupied territory, the enslaved, and Jews subject to genocidal persecution.37 When it came to starvation as a method of warfare, the
results were very different.
The IMT was supplemented by military tribunals run individually by the
occupying powers for the next tier of alleged perpetrators. These subsequent
proceedings were run pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, a regulation
issued by the occupying powers as a collective and replicating much of what
was in the London Charter (the IMT statute that had been drafted by the
four powers in August 1945).38 Included in Control Council Law No. 10 was
an open-ended provision of criminal accountability for “atrocities or offenses against persons or property constituting violations of the laws or customs of war.”39
In the case against fourteen of the highest-ranking members of the
Wehrmacht, some of whom had been members of the Nazi High Command,
the American military tribunal was faced with the question of whether the
siege of Leningrad from 1941 to 1944, in which over a million Russians died,
33. DE WAAL, MASS STARVATION, supra note 1, at 101–5.
34. Mulder & van Dijk, supra note 14 (“Every major power during the Second World
War sought to deprive enemy combatants and civilians of the necessary food supplies as a
means of securing their eventual surrender.”); ARTHUR HERMAN, TO RULE THE WAVES
535, 545 (2004). On the role of food in World War II generally, see LIZZIE COLLINGHAM,
THE TASTE OF WAR: WORLD WAR TWO AND THE BATTLE FOR FOOD (2011).
35. On the politics that led to that, see BASS, supra note 28, ch. 5.
36. 22 TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 411 (1948).
37. See, e.g., id. at 456, 472, 474, 478, 480, 482, 484, 495, 541–44.
38. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity (Dec. 20, 1945), 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE CONTROL
COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50 (1946), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp.
39. Id. art. II(b).
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met the legal threshold prescribed in Control Council Law No. 10. 40 The
tribunal’s ruling on that question has reverberated throughout subsequent
work on the posture of the law of war vis-à-vis starvation. It cited the brandnew second edition of Charles Cheney Hyde’s general treatise on international law for the following proposition:
A belligerent commander may lawfully lay siege to a place controlled by the
enemy and endeavor by a process of isolation to cause its surrender. The
propriety of attempting to reduce it by starvation is not questioned. Hence,
the cutting off of every source of sustenance from without is deemed legitimate.41

Famously, the tribunal then editorialized, “we might wish the law were
otherwise but we must administer it as we find it.”42 In this phrase, the American judges of the High Command case expressed less comfort with the permissibility of starvation as a weapon of war than had earlier legal authorities,
but insisted nonetheless that the existing legal resources were insufficient to
underpin a more prohibitive interpretation. Given the morally infused and
creative legal reasoning adopted at Nuremberg on other fronts, this unwillingness to interpret an open-ended provision to conform to the law for
which the judges claimed to wish is striking. It ought to be considered alongside the fact that the absence of a prohibition of starvation tactics was a legal
opening their home country had exploited during the conflict.43 One of the
intellectual architects of the Nuremberg doctrine of crimes against humanity,
Hersch Lauterpacht, later reflected, “The practice of two world wars was
based on the view that no such sacrosanctity attaches to the civilian population at large as to make illegal the effort to starve it alongside the military
forces of the enemy as a means of inducing him to surrender.” 44 It was a

40. United States v. von Leeb et al. (The High Command Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW NO. 10, at 462, 555, 563 (1949).
41. Id. at 563, citing 3 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1802–3 (2d ed.
1945).
42. Id.
43. See supra note 34.
44. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 360, 374 (1952). On Lauterpacht’s role prior to Nuremberg
on the issue of crimes against humanity, see PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET 3, 113–
15 (2016); more generally, id pt. II.
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method of warfare that the United States and Britain would prove reluctant
to foreclose in the post-war era.45
The first opportunity for a recalibration of the law of war on this issue
arose with the revisions to the Geneva Conventions, and particularly the addition of a Fourth Convention on civilian protection. On the issue of the
starvation of occupied populations, the drafters of the Fourth Convention
were able to agree on relatively robust provisions. Under Article 55, the Occupying Power has “the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of
the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs,
medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are
inadequate.”46 This is supplemented by an unequivocal obligation in Article
59 to consent to and facilitate relief schemes (particularly of food, medical
supplies, and clothing) for that population if it is “inadequately supplied.”47
The Convention is far weaker on the issue of siege starvation and hunger
blockades. As one might expect of those negotiating a treaty in the Geneva
law tradition, the angle from which the drafters approached this issue was
one of humanitarian access, rather than the conduct of hostilities.48 In the
early stages of work on the new and updated conventions, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had argued for certain robust civilian
protections in siege and blockade starvation campaigns.49 Although this approach drew British and American opposition,50 it gained traction with a
number of other States, including the Soviet Union. 51 In response to that
45. Mulder & van Dijk, supra note 14.
46. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
55, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
47. Id. art. 59.
48. The distinction between so-called Hague law and Geneva law was never without
conceptual difficulty. Even the first Geneva Convention in 1864 provided in Article 1 for
the neutrality of hospitals—simultaneously a protection for the wounded and a rule governing the conduct of hostilities. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in the Armies in the Field art. 1, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, T.S. No. 377.
49. 3 COMMISSION OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS FOR THE STUDY OF CONVENTIONS
FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS (GENEVA APRIL 14–26, 1947): PRELIMINARY
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: CONDITION AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN TIME OF WAR 27 (1947); INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS FOR THE STUDY OF THE CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF
WAR VICTIMS 15 (1947); OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 178
(1958).
50. Mulder & van Dijk, supra note 14.
51. Id.
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groundswell, the British focused on “reshaping rather than rejecting the existing proposals” to regulate the protection of encircled and starving populations.52
A Norwegian drafter proposed a compromise that ultimately led to the
provision codified in the Fourth Convention.53 The finally agreed provision
requires parties to allow medical and religious supplies through to adversary
territory, only when those supplies are “intended only for civilians” and extends this requirement to “essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics” only
when those consignments are “intended for children under fifteen, expectant
mothers and maternity cases.”54 As such, it allows for the deliberate denial
of food and clothing to the civilian population more broadly.
Moreover, even those limited obligations are subject to exception if the
belligerent has “serious reasons for fearing” that the consignments may “be
diverted from their destination,” that control over them “may not be effective,” or even that the relief consignments would provide a “definite military
advantage” to the adversary by substituting for goods that would have been
provided by the latter State.55 This, of course, is a caveat so capacious as to
“pull[] the rug from under even the qualified protection” of the core requirement,56 diluting the “obligatory content” of the latter to “nearly nothing.”57
At best, a non-occupying power’s duty under Geneva Convention IV to allow essential goods through to deprived civilians might be described as
“somewhat nominal.”58
The Convention also touches obliquely on the practice (permitted explicitly in the Lieber Code) of driving fleeing civilians back into an encircled
and starved area. Article 17 of Convention IV requires that the parties to the
conflict “endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions,
medical personnel and medical equipment on their way to such areas.” 59
Again, most civilians are excluded from this protection, and food is not
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. GC IV, supra note 46, art. 23.
55. Id.
56. Marcus, supra note 2, at 266.
57. René Provost, Starvation as a Weapon: Legal Implications of the United Nations Food Blockade Against Iraq and Kuwait, 30 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 577, 592
(1992).
58. Lauterpacht, supra note 44, at 376.
59. GC IV, supra note 46, art. 17.
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among the items to be let in. Moreover, the besieging party has only an obligation to endeavor to conclude such an agreement with the besieged party.
There is no obligation to succeed, and no articulated obligation to allow civilians to exit in the absence of an agreement.
Ultimately, these provisions left the use of the starvation of civilians as a
method of war very much intact.60 Indeed, the requirements were sufficiently
lenient for the 1956 U.S. Army law of war field manual to replicate the High
Command rule and some of the language of the earlier Lieber Code. It provides,
It is within the discretion of the besieging commander whether he will permit noncombatants to leave and under what conditions. Thus, if a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants in order to lessen
the logistical burden he has to bear, it is lawful, though an extreme measure,
to drive them back, so as to hasten the surrender. Persons who attempt to
leave or enter a besieged place without obtaining the necessary permission
are liable to be fired upon, sent back, or detained. 61

This posture was not formally reversed until the Department of Defense
(DoD) issued its Law of War Manual in 2015 (revised in 2016), recognizing
the illegality of forcing the return of civilians to besieged areas as a matter of
customary international law.62 The Manual derives this obligation from the
general requirement to take precautionary measures to minimize civilian
loss—a principle articulated in the 1977 update to Hague and Geneva law,
the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.63
60. British Foreign Minister Michael Stewart, on the issue of Nigeria’s policy of starving
out the people (and insurgents) of Biafra: “We must accept that, in the whole history of
warfare, any nation which has been in a position to starve its enemy out has done so.” 786
Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (1969) col. 953.
61. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 44 (1956).
62. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF
WAR MANUAL § 5.19.4.1 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
63. Id. § 5.19.4.1. See also HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, THE COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 2-1-2 (2019). In Additional Protocol I, this
principle is codified in Article 57(2)(a)(ii), which provides that parties are to “take all feasible
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in
any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to
civilian objects.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
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The amendment could equally have been rooted in a different rule developed in Additional Protocol I and its NIAC analogue, Additional Protocol II.64 The codification of these treaties marked the moment when IHL
switched from a regime under which starvation was permitted with only very
light regulation to one in which it was the subject of a relatively comprehensive prohibition. The key IAC provision in Protocol I is Article 54, which is
worth replicating in full here. It provides:
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works,
for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to
the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive,
whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away,
or for any other motive.
3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects
covered by it as are used by an adverse Party:
a. as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
b. if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects
be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population
with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or
force its movement.
4. These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.
5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in
the defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation from
the prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to
the conflict within such territory under its own control where required
by imperative military necessity.65

Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 57(2)(a)(ii), June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter AP I]. Accepting the customary status of the prohibition of the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, see U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 62, § 5.20.1.
64. AP I, supra note 63, art. 54; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 14, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].
65. AP I, supra note 63, art. 54.
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Debates as to the scope and reach of this prohibition are addressed in Parts
IV and V. However, on its face, it is a robust ban, particularly when compared to the permissive regime that had preceded it.
The most obvious gap in the prohibition is the so-called “scorched
earth” exception in paragraph five, whereby a party can derogate from the
ban in a context of defensive emergency. However, derogation of that kind
is available only during a very short temporal window (in the face of invasion,
but where the territory remains in the scorching party’s control), applies only
to the destruction of objects indispensable to civilian survival on the scorching party’s own sovereign territory, and is tenable only to the extent such
action is required by defensive necessity. These conditions, which evoke the
similarly narrow levée en masse exception to the requirements of privileged belligerency, tightly limit the reach of the exception and render it entirely inapplicable to sieges and naval blockades.66 More significant, then, are the limits
internal to the fundamental prohibition (as articulated in paragraphs one and
two) and the core exceptions to it (as defined in paragraph three). These are
discussed further in the ensuing Parts.
The scorched-earth exception notwithstanding, there is no restriction on
the class or nationality of civilians protected by Article 54. Relatedly, a proposal by Pakistan to exclude a ban on starvation from Additional Protocol
II on the grounds that it was inappropriate to limit the State’s use of such
tactics in internal conflicts was unsuccessful.67 Article 14 of Additional Protocol II, which was ultimately adopted by consensus, provides that even in
NIACs,
Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore
prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose,
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as

66. On the levee en masse exception, see Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(6), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
GC III].
67. Pakistan Statement, Doc. CDDH/427 (May 31, 1977), 4 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA (1974–
1977), at 87 (1978) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS] (noting that there are seventeen volumes of these official records).
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foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works. 68

In contrast to the IAC provision, which includes exceptions in paragraphs three and five, the ICRC Commentary describes Article 14 of Protocol
II as “a rule from which no derogation may be made,” noting that a formulation “whereby it would have been possible to make an exception in case of
imperative military necessity was not adopted.”69 Derivative of that, the
ICRC understands the customary starvation ban to be a rare instance in
which the NIAC prohibition is more comprehensive than is its IAC counterpart.70
The key areas of interpretive debate of direct relevance to the issue of
encirclement deprivation are addressed below. There are, however, two
points of relatively broad interpretive consensus that are worth emphasizing
before turning to the issue of humanitarian access. First, notwithstanding the
ordinary meaning of the term, few understand the starvation ban to cover
only the deprivation of food and water.71 Rather, the prohibition extends to
the severe deprivation of any goods essential to human survival, including
items such as medical supplies or clothing.72 Second, starvation is understood
in law primarily as a process rather than an outcome.73 In other words, the
deprivation of essential items in a context in which that deprivation threatens
68. Reporting that the consensus adoption was grounded in humanitarian considerations, see Federica D’Alessandra & Matthew Gillett, The War Crime of Starvation in Non-International Armed Conflict, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 815, 819 (2019).
69. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 4795 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
70. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 54 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1.
71. For an exception, see Manuel J. Ventura, Prosecuting Starvation under International Criminal Law: Exploring the Legal Possibilities, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
781, 789 (2019) (“The meaning of the word ‘starvation’ would be stretched beyond recognition if it were to encompass a well-fed person that is deprived of clothing.”).
72. Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 740; Dapo Akande & Emanuela-Chiara
Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity and the War Crime of Starvation of Civilians as a Method of
Warfare: The Underlying Rules of International Humanitarian Law, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 753, 758–60 (2019); Knut Dörmann, War Crimes Under the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a Special Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of
Crimes, 7 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 341, 388 (2003).
73. On the distinction, see, e.g., Bridget Conley & Alex de Waal, The Purposes of Starvation, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 699, 700 (2019).
323

International Law Studies

2021

survival or impedes the capacity of persons to sustain life violates the starvation ban, whether or not victims die or suffer a particular level of malnourishment as a result of that deprivation.74
Supplementing this core prohibition are articles updating and revising
the prior rules on humanitarian access to civilian populations in contexts
other than belligerent occupation. Article 70 of Protocol I states that when
the civilian population
is not adequately provided with [food, medical supplies, clothing, bedding,
means of shelter, and other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian
population], relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions. 75

It provides further that the parties to the conflict (and all other Additional
Protocol I parties) “shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage
of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel provided in accordance
with this Section, even if such assistance is destined for the civilian population of the adverse Party.”76
The meaning of this provision, too, is debated, particularly with respect
to the scope of State discretion in granting or denying consent to humanitarian offers. However, three significant shifts from Article 23 of Geneva
Convention IV are immediately noticeable. First, Article 70 protects all civilians, not just specific subcategories. Second, it protects a broader range of
humanitarian relief—namely, all supplies essential to civilian survival. Third,
the provision does not include the loopholes that so diminish the force of
the obligation in Article 23 of Convention IV. Instead, a party granting humanitarian access under Additional Protocol I is limited to imposing “technical arrangements, including search” and to making the passage of relief
“conditional on the distribution of this assistance being made under the local
supervision of a Protecting Power.”77 Article 71 allows only temporary restrictions to agreed relief in cases of “imperative military necessity.”78
74. Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 760–61; Group of
Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 741; International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes
31, Doc. No. ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11_Eng (2011) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes].
75. AP I, supra note 63, art. 70(1).
76. Id. art. 70(2).
77. Id. art. 70(3).
78. Id. art. 71(3).
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A final shift from Geneva Convention IV is worth noting briefly, although it implicates a debate explicated below regarding the discretion to
deny humanitarian access.79 Article 10 of Geneva Convention IV provides
that the Convention presents “no obstacle to the humanitarian activities
which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial
humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the
conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of civilian persons and for
their relief.”80 Article 70 of Additional Protocol I differs from that provision
both in its greater detail, but also in providing that relief actions “shall be
undertaken” subject to the parties’ agreement, rather than merely that they
“may be undertaken” subject to that consent.81 Many take this subtle shift to
indicate that State discretion regarding whether to allow humanitarian actors
to access populations in need is limited in important respects.82
Overall, the apparent tightening of the rules of humanitarian access in
Additional Protocol I is sufficient for some to argue that the weaknesses of
the Geneva IV rules on humanitarian access were “remedied to a large extent” by the 1977 treaty.83 With slightly different wording, Article 18 of Protocol II extends the same basic framework to NIACs, providing,
If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the
supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies,
relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse
distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.84

Of course, a crucial question regarding rules of the Additional Protocols
is whether they or some variation on them, have customary status for the
79. See infra notes 203–211, 314–338 and accompanying text.
80. GC IV, supra note 46, art. 10 (replicated for combatants rendered hors de combat by
wounds, sickness, shipwreck, or detention in common Article 9 of Geneva Conventions I,
II, and III). Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; GC
III, supra note 66, art. 9.
81. AP I, supra note 63, art. 70 (emphasis added).
82. See infra notes 315–338 and accompanying text.
83. Jelena Pejic, The Right to Food in Situations of Armed Conflict: The Legal Framework, 83
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1097, 1103 (2011).
84. AP II, supra note 64, art. 18.
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small but militarily significant minority of States that have not ratified the
treaties.85 In its landmark 2005 study of customary IHL, the ICRC found the
relevant rules discussed above to be customarily binding on all States in both
IACs and NIACs.86 Various commentators have advanced arguments in favor of that position.87 Some point to the consensus support for the starvation
ban during Protocol I negotiations, including among those that did not go
on to ratify the treaty as a whole.88 It is also notable that a wide range of
States incorporate the ban the use of starvation as a method of warfare into
their military manuals.89 Encirclements, such as blockades, have often included humanitarian corridors of one form or another in the decades since
the Protocols were negotiated.90 And on the occasions that starvation tactics
have been used, they have been condemned.91
At the level of State action through international organizations, the U.N.
General Assembly has rejected the deprivation of food as an instrument of
pressure and condemned starvation in armed conflict on numerous occasions.92 The Security Council has similarly condemned the “denial of humanitarian access,” identified “willfully impeding relief supply and access” as a
85. Although one hundred and seventy-four States are bound by Protocol I in their
mutual engagements, among the non-parties are a number of States that are of significant
interest from a law of armed conflict perspective, including Eritrea, India, Indonesia, Israel,
Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey, and the United States. In addition to lacking each of those States,
Protocol II also lacks Iraq and Syria among its States parties.
86. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 70, rr. 53–55.
87. See, e.g., Provost, supra note 57, at 628–38; DAPO AKANDE & EMANUELA-CHIARA
GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE ON THE LAW RELATING TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT 95–96, 136 n.105 (2016). But see Salvatore
Zappala, Conflict Related Hunger, ‘Starvation Crimes’ and UN Security Council Resolution 2417, 17
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 881, 899 (2019).
88. Provost, supra note 57, at 631.
89. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 53 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/
docs/v2_rul_rule53.
90. See, e.g., Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, ¶¶ 20, 26, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oct. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e252?rskey=6ktGAZ&result=1&prd=MPIL; Louise Doswald-Beck, San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable
to Armed Conflict at Sea, 35 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 583, 584 (1995).
In some cases, the exceptions have been condemned as insufficient under existing customary law. See, e.g., Provost, supra note 57, at 638.
91. D'Alessandra & Gillett, supra note 68, at 823; Provost, supra note 57, at 634.
92. For just a few examples over time, see, e.g., G.A. Res. 185 (Dec. 17, 1981); G.A. Res.
48/88 (Dec. 20, 1993); G.A. Res. 49/10 (Nov. 3, 1994); G.A. Res. 49/196 (Dec. 23, 1994)
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violation of IHL, and classified starvation as a threat to international peace
and security that warrants outside intervention.93 In 2018, the Council approved unanimously a resolution stating that it “strongly condemns the unlawful denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supply and access for responses to conflict-induced food insecurity in situations of armed
conflict,” noting that such actions “may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law.”94 It further noted that the starvation of civilians as
a method of warfare might constitute a war crime.95
As a non-party to the Protocols, it is notable that Israel’s government
and High Court of Justice have relied on the customary status of the rules
articulated in Articles 54 and 70 of Additional Protocol I to evaluate and
permit (controversially) the State’s actions in controlling the fuel and electricity supply into Gaza.96 Similarly, despite U.S. objections to the methodology of the ICRC study,97 the country’s Law of War Manual recognizes the
prohibition of starvation as a customary rule and clarifies (as noted above)
that it understands the forced return of fleeing civilians back into a besieged
area of starving people to be a violation of international law.98 The Manual is
more equivocal on whether “all of [the] particulars” of Article 54 of Protocol
I reflect customary international law, but it accepts the core ban.99
On the issue of humanitarian relief, it is interesting that the U.S. DoD
Law of War Manual focuses exclusively on the framework provided in Article
23 of Geneva Convention IV.100 In contrast to many other provisions of the
First Protocol, the customary credentials of which are either affirmed or rejected explicitly, Article 70 of Protocol I is not referenced directly a single

93. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2139 (Feb. 25, 2014); S.C. Res. 733 (Jan. 23, 1992); S.C. Res. 761
(June 21, 1992).
94. S.C. Res 2417, ¶ 6 (May 24, 2018).
95. Id. pmbl.
96. HCJ 9132/07 Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed and others v. Prime Minister and Minister
of Defence ¶¶ 13–22 (2008), http://www.hamoked.org/items/9862_eng.pdf (unofficial
translation) (Isr.).
97. John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007).
98. U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 62, § 5.20.
99. Id. § 5.20.4.
100. Id. § 5.19.3.
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time in the Manual. 101 In a prior review of Additional Protocol I by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Article 70 was deemed acceptable only subject to the caveat
that humanitarian access could be denied on the grounds of “imperative considerations of military necessity,” to preclude a “radical, if perhaps unintended, change in the customary law of siege and blockade warfare, which
has always allowed the besieging and blockading power to cut off all supplies
going to areas of enemy control.”102 This issue is addressed further in the
ensuing Parts.
A final development relevant both on its own terms as an additional feature of the starvation ban and in its implications for the customary status of
the rules articulated in the Additional Protocols today is the criminalization
of starvation as a method of warfare. Developments here postdate the publication of the San Remo Manual, and so are of particular relevance to the
latter’s revision.
The ban on starvation as a method of warfare was omitted from the
grave breaches provision of Additional Protocol I and absent from the statutes and jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda.103 As at Nuremberg, and despite the scale of the deprivations inflicted in the sieges of Sarajevo and Srebrenica, starvation was prosecuted
before the tribunals only when inflicted on detainees. 104 In line with that
trend, neither of the International Law Commission’s 1994 and 1996 drafts

101. There is a single indirect reference to Article 70 in the Manual as a whole, which
occurs in a quote from a speech by a former Deputy Legal Adviser in a footnote that references that quote for its position on Article 54 (also mentioned), not Article 70. Id. at 317
n.724.
102. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Review of the 1977 First Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, at 72–73, to Secretary of Defense (May 3,
1985),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/
Joint_Staff/1985_JCSM_152-85_Review_of_GC_AP_I.pdf
103. AP I, supra note 63, art. 85.
104. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 1029, 1204,
1207, 1232, 1252, 1265, 1291, 1303–7, 3232, 3287–99, 3306, 3312, 3450–55 (Int’l Crim. for
the former Yugoslavia Nov. 22, 2017). On the starvation conditions in Srebrenica and Sarajevo, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 2330–36, 2389, 4557, 4599–606, 4845; Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1994), transmitted
by Letter dated May 27, 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, annex, ¶ 204, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994).
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of an international criminal code for a permanent court address the issue of
starvation as a method of warfare.105
At this point, however, things began to change. In 1995, the U.N. General Assembly provided for a Preparatory Committee, open to all States, to
establish what would become the International Criminal Court (ICC).106
Shortly after the International Law Commission released its 1996 draft, the
Preparatory Committee published its first compilation of proposals. Among
them was “starving of the civilian population and prevention of humanitarian assistance from reaching them.”107 The Preparatory Committee proposals
went through several iterations before developing into the Rome Statute of
today. During that process, a NIAC version of the crime was proposed. 108
However, it was dropped during final negotiations for reasons that remain
hazy even for those who were at the Rome Conference, except to say that
there was a general wariness of an excessive expansion of the war crimes
code in NIACs.109 Rogier Bartels suggests the omission of the NIAC war
105. International Law Commission, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Court, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/L.491/Rev.2 (1994); International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/51/10, at 15 (1996) (Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
with commentaries). The only mention of starvation in the Commission’s commentaries is
through the use of detainee starvation as an example to illuminate the concept of superior
responsibility. Id. at 25 (“A military commander contributes directly to the commission of a
crime when he orders his subordinate to carry out a criminal act, such as killing an unarmed
civilian, or to refrain from performing an act which the subordinate has a duty to perform,
such as refraining from providing food for prisoners of war which results in their starvation.”)
106. G.A. Res. 50/46, Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Dec. 11,
1995).
107. Michael Cottier & Emilia Richard, Article 8(2)(b)(xxv), in THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 508, 510 (Otto Triffterer & Kai
Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2016); 2 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/51/22, at 61 (Compilation of Proposals),
(1996).
108. Rogier Bartels, Denying Humanitarian Access as an International Crime in Times of NonInternational Armed Conflict: The Challenges to Prosecute and Some Proposals for the Future, 48 ISRAEL
LAW REVIEW 281, 297–98 (2015).
109. Panel on Starvation in Armed Conflicts (panelists: Federica D’Alessandra, Brian
Lander, Matthias Lanz, and Charles Garraway), Geneva Academy (May 2, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tmg7kAB27Qg. Charles Garraway, who was at the
Rome Conference, “my own belief is it fell just below the threshold, bearing in mind there
were still States in Rome who were not prepared to accept any, any offenses [in NIACs]
except perhaps common article 3.” Id. at 28:50; Matthias Lanz, having explored the travaux
329

International Law Studies

2021

crime was “an oversight, perhaps caused by the unfortunate placing of the
proposed crime together with various versions of disproportionate use of
force,” which were dropped due to the absence of proportionality from Additional Protocol II (an absence that was, of course, not replicated in the case
of starvation and humanitarian access).110
The finally agreed IAC provision criminalizes “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as
provided for under the Geneva Conventions.”111 The provision has yet to be
invoked or interpreted by any ICC authority, although this hardly makes it
unique among Rome Statute provisions. In December 2019, following significant political mobilization, the Court’s Assembly of States Parties approved an amendment extending the war crime to NIACs, replicating the
language of the IAC crime, except for the reference to the Geneva Conventions.112 The Assembly was unanimous in approving the amendment, but the
longer and more arduous task of ratification remains.113
The criminalization of starvation in the Rome Statute has been catalytic.
Many States that are party to the ICC system replicate the Rome Statute
framework in their domestic war crimes codes. For that reason, it is unsurprising that thus far, many States have incorporated only the IAC war

in preparation for the 2018 Swiss proposal, “you find . . . no real information in the travaux
préparatoires on why this happened, so I think . . . it was chaotic and there was a lot of
politics involved is probably what comes closest to the truth. . . . We believe that [the NIAC
draft provision] was [deleted from what became the final Statute as] part of a bigger package
where tradeoffs were made.” Id. at 36:18. See also Cottier & Richard, supra note 107, at 510;
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 285
(5th ed. 2017).
110. Bartels, supra note 108, at 298.
111. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xxv), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. (last amended November 29, 2010, depository notification
C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
112. Report of the Working Group on Amendments, Assembly of States Parties, Doc.
No. ICC-ASP/18/32, app. I, art. 8(2)(e)(xix) (Dec. 3, 2019). The amendment had been proposed by Switzerland in a non-paper. Report of the Working Group on Amendments, Assembly of States Parties, Doc. No. ICC-ASP/17/35, annex IV (Nov. 29, 2018) [hereinafter
Switzerland Non-paper].
113. In accordance with the Rome Statute’s amendment regime, the new provision will
enter into force only for States Parties that go on to ratify it. ICC Statute, supra note 111,
art. 121(5). At the time of publication, three States have ratified the amendment: Andorra,
the Netherlands, and New Zealand.
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crime.114 Those hybrid tribunals that have replicated the ICC’s war crimes
code have also included an IAC war crime of starvation as a method of warfare.115 More expansively, the (as yet not in force) Malabo Protocol for a
supranational criminal justice chamber in the African Union system, the
Group of Experts on Yemen, the Commission on Human Rights in South
Sudan, and many States in their domestic criminal codes recognized starvation as a customary war crime with applicability in both IACs and NIACs
before that change was made at the ICC.116 The Commission on Human
Rights in South Sudan has also advocated the incorporation of the NIAC
starvation crime into the statute of the promised Hybrid Court for South

114. Based on a search of the ICC legal tools database (legal-tools.org), and the ICRC’s
customary IHL study. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 89,
r. 53, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule53. States that
have criminalized starvation as a method of warfare in IACs, but not NIACS (often due to
a straight transposition of the ICC Statute provisions) include Australia, Burundi, Canada,
Congo, France, Georgia, Ireland, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Samoa, Slovenia, South Africa, Timor-Leste, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United
Kingdom.
115. United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor, Regulation No. 2000/15,
On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction of Serious Criminal Offenses
art. 6(1)(b)(xxv), June 6, 2000, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/
etimor/untaetR/Reg0015E.pdf; Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 13(b)(xxv), Dec.
10, 2003, reprinted in 43 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 231 (2004); Law No. 05/L-053
on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office art. 14(1)(b)(xxv), Kosovo,
Aug. 3, 2015, https://www.scp-ks.org/en/documents/law-specialist-chambers-and-specialist-prosecutors-office.
116. Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights annex, arts. 28D(b)(xxvi), 28D(e)(xvi), June 27, 2014, A.U. Doc.
No. STC/Legal/Min/7(l) Rev. l; Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 748; Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, “There is nothing left for us”: Starvation as a Method
of Warfare in South Sudan, ¶¶ 35–38, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/45/CRP.3 (Oct. 5, 2020) [hereinafter Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan]. Based on a search of the ICC legal tools
database (legal-tools.org), and the ICRC’s customary IHL study. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 89, r. 53, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule53. States codifying starvation as a war crime, regardless of
conflict classification, include Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Ethiopia, Norway,
Rwanda, and Spain. States that provide explicitly that starvation can be perpetrated in a
NIAC, include Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Germany, Kosovo, the Netherlands, Peru, Portugal,
Philippines, South Korea, Switzerland, and Uruguay. See also D’Alessandra & Gillett, supra
note 68, at 820 n.20 (also including Austria, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and Sweden).
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Sudan.117 Cases remain few and far between, but the legislative trajectory is
clear.118
The significance of these developments is not limited to war crimes law.
The ICC starvation crimes are enshrined in the Rome Statute as “serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in [IACs or NIACs, respectively], within the established framework of international law.”119 This language reflects a broader principle that the status of a particular act as a war
crime depends on the prohibition of that action as a matter of IHL.120 There
are currently 123 States parties to the ICC. Two additional States were parties
before withdrawing for reasons unrelated to the starvation crime.121 Each of
those 125 States, through ratification or accession, affirmed that the war
crime of starvation as a method of warfare is rooted in an underlying IHL
prohibition—one that applies without difficulty to the nationals of non-party
States when they act on the territory of ICC States parties. Three of those
States are not themselves party to the Additional Protocols.122 At least three
additional States that have recognized the war crime status of the practice in
their domestic codes are party to neither the Protocols nor the Rome Statute.123 Each lends additional support to the principle that starvation as a
method of warfare is both illegal as a matter of customary IHL and a war
crime for which individuals may be held accountable under international law.
117. Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, supra note 116, ¶¶ 43, 148(e). The
Court is provided for in the Revitalised Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South
Sudan, Sept. 12, 2018, https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2112.
118. The two exceptions typically invoked here are Public Prosecutor v. M.P. et al. and
Special Prosecutor v. Col. Mengistu Hailamariam et al. Public Prosecutor v. M.P. et al., Case
No. K. 74/96, Verdict (District Ct. Zadar, Croatia Apr. 24, 1997), http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/1053; Special Prosecutor v. Col. Mengistu Hailamariam et
al., Criminal File No. 1/87, Judgment ( Ethiopian Federal High Court Dec. 12, 2006).
119. ICC Statute, supra note 111, arts. 8(2)(b), 8(2)(e) (emphasis added).
120. Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadić Interlocutory Appeal]; Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 755.
121.Agence France-Presse, Burundi Becomes First Nation to Leave International Criminal
Court, GUARDIAN, (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/28/
burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-international-criminal-court; Duterte’s Statement on International Criminal Court Withdrawal, RAPPLER.COM (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.rappler.com/nation/198171-full-text-philippines-rodrigo-duterte-statement-internationalcriminal-court-withdrawal.
122. Andorra, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands.
123. Azerbaijan, Iran, and Kosovo.
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THE SAN REMO MANUAL AND ITS
HUMANITARIAN VULNERABILITIES

The core form of comprehensive encirclement deprivation in naval warfare
is the blockade. It is unsurprising, then, that the San Remo Manual addresses
the issues of starvation and humanitarian access in its blockade law framework. More surprising is the exclusivity of that incorporation. Whereas the
Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare includes both
generally applicable provisions on starvation and humanitarian access and
specific starvation rules within the framework governing air blockades, 124 the
San Remo Manual does not address the issues of starvation or humanitarian
access outside of the blockade context.125 This is a significant omission. Severe deprivations can be inflicted on the civilian population via forms of
naval warfare (and even naval encirclement) that do not qualify as blockades
in the technical sense.126 Indeed, questions have been raised about whether
the law of blockade applies to the two most heavily scrutinized naval encirclement and deprivation operations in recent years—Israel on Gaza and the
Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition on Yemen.127 Whatever one makes of the
status of those specific actions, it is remarkable both that the Manual is silent
on the issue of starvation via naval methods other than blockade and that
there is no explanation for that silence. The issue is particularly pertinent in
NIACs, given that, on the dominant view, “blockade is a method of warfare
recognized to apply in international armed conflicts only.”128 But put that
issue to one side. The deeper point of concern is that the San Remo blockade
regime itself has significant humanitarian infirmities.
Having affirmed and clarified the customary status of the longstanding
London Declaration rules on efficacy, publicity, specificity, universality, and
124. The HPCR Manual more or less replicates the San Remo Manual on the law of
blockade (with the small deviation noted below). HPCR MANUAL, supra note 11, rr. 157–
59. However, it also provides general starvation rules. Id. rr. 97, 100–4.
125. Apart from the provisions on blockade, the only other rules of the San Remo Manual that are somewhat relevant are those protecting vessels engaged in humanitarian relief
or carrying supplies to the survival of the civilian population from attack or capture. SRM,
supra note 10, rr. 47, 136, 150.
126. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, supra note 90, ¶ 57; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockades and Interdictions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 925, 927 (Marc Weller ed. 2015).
127. See infra note 386.
128. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockades and Interdictions, supra note 126, ¶ 25. Cf. infra
notes 375–376, 386–387 and accompanying text.
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respect for neutral States,129 the Manual’s key modernizing step was to introduce constraints relating to starvation and the deprivation of essential items
into both the test for the legality of imposing a blockade (in paragraph 102)
and the rules for managing a blockade once imposed (in paragraphs 103–4).
These provisions represent the drafters’ effort to incorporate the developments discussed in the previous Part. Indeed, the San Remo Explanation
describes these rules as “affected by” and “drawn from” the Protocol I rules
banning starvation and governing humanitarian access.130
A. Prohibited Blockades
The Manual identifies two kinds of prohibited blockade. Pursuant to paragraph 102(a), it is illegal to declare or establish a blockade that “has the sole
purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other objects essential for its survival.”131 Irrespective of the operation’s purpose, paragraph
102(b) prohibits establishing or declaring a blockade in a context in which
“the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the
blockade.”132 These rules have been cited heavily in analyses of Israel’s blockade of Gaza.133 They are replicated with a small (though not insignificant)

129. Namely: efficacy, declaration and notification, specification of temporal and geographic scope (as well as the time for neutral States’ vessels to leave), non-restriction of
access to neutral States’ ports or coasts, impartiality with respect to vessels of all States, and
proper declaration, notification, and specification of cessation, temporary lifting, re-establishment, extension, or other alteration. SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 93–101.
130. SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 102.1, 103.1.
131. Id. ¶ 102(a).
132. Id. ¶ 102(b).
133. Report of the International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting
from the Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance, ¶ 50,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/21 (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hr
council/docs/15session/A.HRC.15.21_en.pdf [hereinafter International Fact-Finding Mission]; Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, ¶ 157 (Sept. 2011), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
Full_Report_2235.pdf [hereinafter Palmer Report]; 1 JACOB TURKEL ET AL., THE PUBLIC
COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE MARITIME INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 2010, ¶ 61 (2011),
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/downloads_eng1/en/ENG_turkel_eng_
a.pdf [hereinafter TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT].
334

Encircling, Deprivation, and Humanity

Vol. 97

change in the HPCR Manual on air and missile warfare.134 They are referenced frequently in scholarly work and military manuals.135 And yet, the constraints they impose are anemic.
In prohibiting only blockades with the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or depriving it of objects indispensable for its survival, subparagraph 102(a) sets the subjective threshold for State breach higher even
than that required to establish direct individual criminal responsibility for
genocide. For the latter, it is sufficient to show that the special genocidal
intent (acting with a view to destroying a protected group in whole or in part)
was one of the purposes driving an individual’s wrongful conduct.136 For the
former, the starvation of the civilian population must be the sole purpose of
the State action; even a blockade with the clear primary purpose of starving
or depriving civilians of essentials would avoid violating 102(a), as long as at
least one other secondary purpose could be established.137 Thus, for example,
even if one were to hold that the blockade of Yemen sought at various points
to starve the civilian population as a method of warfare,138 it would be
enough to avoid violating 102(a) to show that the encirclement also sought
to guarantee that supplies to enemy fighters were cut off completely or that
enemy fighters were starved, or to divert the attention and resources of the
blockaded adversary away from military projects.139
It is difficult to imagine a blockade that would fail the sole purpose test.
It is even harder to imagine a blockade that could not be defended successfully against an allegation to that effect. Establishing a breach would require
not just proving the existence of the wrongful purpose (itself a difficult task

134. HPCR MANUAL, supra note 11, r. 157. But note infra note 137.
135. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, supra note 90, ¶ 51; 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 70, r. 53.
136. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 53 (July
9, 2004) (establishing genocide requires only that “the proscribed acts were committed
against the victims because of their membership in the protected group, but not solely because
of such membership”).
137 Note the not insignificant shift in the HPCR Manual, which prohibits aerial blockades with the “sole or primary purpose” of starving civilians. HPCR MANUAL, supra note 11,
r. 157(a) (emphasis added).
138. Along these lines, see Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, ¶ 190, U.N.
Doc. S/2018/594 (Jan. 26, 2018) (“The blockade is essentially using the threat of starvation
as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war.”).
139. Cf. Palmer Report, supra note 133, ¶ 77 (“it is evident that Israel had a military
objective. The stated primary objective of the naval blockade was for security”). See also id.
app. I, ¶¶ 33–34.
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at the best of times),140 but also proving the absence of any other purpose.
Conversely, all that would be needed to defend against such a charge would
be a plausible claim to at least one additional secondary purpose. The range
of realistic scenarios in which such a legal defense would not be viable is
sufficiently barren to render the rule in paragraph 102(a) a practical nullity.
Given that implication, the San Remo Explanation is strikingly laconic
in accounting for the use of “sole” in 102(a). The Explanation simply indicates that the humanitarian protections provided in 102(b), 103, and 104 regulate blockades not driven by the sole purpose of starving civilians. 141 The
mere fact of other rules, however, does not make sense of framing the primary prohibition so narrowly as to render it meaningless, particularly in the
absence of any clear legal basis for that narrow framing. 142
The consequence of recognizing paragraph 102(a) to be a practical nullity
is that paragraph 102(b) becomes the Manual’s only functional humanitarian
prohibition on imposing a blockade. It prohibits blockades expected to cause
damage to the civilian population that is excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated. This draws directly on the language
used to articulate the standard proportionality rule for attacks in Additional
Protocol I.143 Issues arise here concerning both the basis for this provision
and its utility as a source of human protection.
Strikingly the Explanation says nothing about the basis for including a
proportionality rule here, other than to note that it covers the gaps left by
102(a) regarding blockades that are not directed exclusively at starving the
civilian population.144 One explanation would be that the Manual considers
the blockade to be a form of “attack,” such that jus in bello proportionality
would apply as a matter of course.145 Whether or not such an interpretation
140. Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 40
(July 7, 2006).
141. SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 102.2–102.4.
142. Certainly, it is not derived from the rules on starvation in the Additional Protocols.
Cf. supra note 64.
143. AP I, supra note 63, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b).
144. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 102.4.
145. On the notion that deprivation by encirclement (whether siege or blockade) may
qualify as attacks, see Gloria Gaggioli, Joint Blog Series on International Law and Armed Conflict:
Are Sieges Prohibited under Contemporary IHL?, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/joint-blog-series-on-international-law-and-armed-conflict-aresieges-prohibited-under-contemporary-ihl/; Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Sieges, The Law Protecting Civilians 8 (2019), https://reader.chathamhouse.org/sieges-law-and-protecting-civil336
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could be reconciled with the Protocol I definition of an “attack” as an “act[]
of violence against the adversary,” such an approach would seem to raise
issues of consistency internal to the San Remo Manual itself. 146 The Manual
includes a general proportionality rule for attacks in paragraph 46(d), alongside several other rules for the protection of civilians in the course of attacks
that are not replicated in the blockade provisions.147 If the assumption underpinning the Manual is that blockades are attacks, this is a puzzling asymmetry.
Alternatively, one might reason that proportionality is a general principle
of IHL applicable to all methods of warfare, whether or not they qualify as
“attacks” in the technical sense.148 If that is the Manual’s position, it is sufficiently important to warrant express articulation and justification. It would
also raise questions regarding what distinguishes proportionality from other
core targeting rules that might also be thought to be general principles of
IHL, but which do not find direct articulation in the Manual’s blockade rules.
The principle of distinction, for example, may have an even stronger claim
to being a general principle of IHL than does proportionality, and yet it finds
only partial incorporation in paragraph 102(a).149 Whatever the explanation
for the role of proportionality in 102(b), it is remarkable that the commentary
declines to offer it. And yet, the uncertainty of its basis notwithstanding, it is
also clear that the Manual’s invocation of proportionality has resonated in the
interpretations and approaches of subsequent authorities.150
ians (drawing on the standard articulated for cyber operations in the Tallinn Manual). TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, r. 92. Others have advocated a similarly broad understanding of “attack” in the contexts of cyber-warfare and cultural property protections. ICRC
EXPERT MEETING, THE POTENTIAL HUMAN COST OF CYBER OPERATIONS, at 72–73
(Nov. 14–16, 2018), https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/97346/the-potential-human-cost-of-cyber-operations.pdf; Eian Katz, Milena Sterio & Jonathan Worboys, “Attacks” Against Hospitals and Cultural Property: Broad in Time, Broad in Substance, ARTICLES OF
WAR (Nov. 17, 2020), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/attacks-against-hospitals-cultural-property-broad/.
146. AP I, supra note 63, art. 49(1).
147. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 46(d). See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text.
148. Jan Kleffner, Military Collaterals and Ius in Bello Proportionality, 48 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (2018).
149. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 12 (3d ed. 2016).
150. See, e.g., TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶ 88; Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1, at 2,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/3/2 (Nov. 23, 2006); 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW, supra note 89, r. 53; U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 62, §§ 13.10.2.5,
5.20.2, 17.9.2.1.
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Justification for its inclusion aside, the key substantive question regarding 102(b) is whether the proportionality principle introduces practically significant humanitarian limits into the law of blockade. There are three reasons
to be skeptical of the presumption that it does. First, even in the contexts
most hospitable to it, proportionality analysis suffers from systematic deficiencies relating to uncertainty, ambiguity, and subjectivity. Second, the parallel rules that mitigate those deficiencies in the targeting context are not
incorporated into the San Remo framework for blockades. Third, the deficiencies of the proportionality rule in targeting are amplified when transposed to blockades, due to the scope and duration of the latter. Consider
these in turn.
IHL proportionality is famously complicated to apply, even in standard
targeting cases.151 Challenges of ex ante measurement in contexts of uncertainty are layered onto the difficulty of aggregating across forms of civilian
loss or military advantage, and debates about who and what counts and on
what time horizon. More fundamentally, even when there is agreement about
what counts in the calculation of civilian loss expected and military advantage
anticipated, the process of evaluating those qualitatively different values in
relation to one another is hamstrung by the lack of a universally accepted
exchange rate or other basis for comparison.
Some of these complications are mitigated in the targeting context. Proportionality calculations are ordinarily part of an interdependent framework
of targeting restrictions, including the rules of distinction, discrimination,
and precautions. In a standard attack, the question of whether civilian loss is
excessive in relation to military advantage arises only if the civilians were not
the target, the attack was targeted exclusively against a discrete military objective, and all feasible precautions were taken to verify the relevant information and to ensure that the collateral civilian loss was avoided, or at least
minimized. Put another way, proportionality ordinarily comes at the end of
a decision tree that has multiple prior junctures at which civilian-protecting
rules may preclude the attack irrespective of how the military advantage anticipated compares to the civilian loss expected.

151. See, e.g., Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 48–50, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1257 (2000); Janina Dill, Assessing Proportionality, INTERCROSS
(Oct.
11,
2016),
https://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/
r19aesa7v1kylcc5a4hbcwvfx8imus.
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The San Remo Manual, however, does not appear to extend that broader
framework to blockades. It includes distinction, discrimination, proportionality, and precautions in its basic rules on the conduct of hostilities.152 However, whereas proportionality is replicated in the specific regime for blockades, the other restrictions are not, except in the specific and limited forms
of paragraphs 103 and 104 (discussed below), relating to certain aspects of
minimizing civilian damage, and paragraph 102(a), with its extremely narrow
prohibition on blockades implemented with the sole purpose of starving the
civilian population. Interpreted in light of the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the San Remo position appears to be that blockades are not
restricted by the general rules of distinction, discrimination, or general precautions.153 If that reading of the Manual is incorrect, the application of those
principles to blockades should be clarified in the revision; the implications
would be profound.154
Assuming that the Manual’s rules on blockades are indeed exclusive, the
combination of the nullity of 102(a) and the lack of a broader framework of
complementary protections places enormous functional pressure on the capacity of proportionality to operate as an isolated and yet effective humanitarian constraint. The difficulty, however, is that proportionality’s ordinary
weaknesses in that regard are exacerbated by the nature of blockades. Targeting operations tend to be short in duration and scope, allowing for a relatively clear sense of the likely civilian loss and likely military advantage, with
a contained degree of uncertainty in either direction. Such operations also
occur sufficiently frequently to enable the iterated development of rough
norms regarding what constitutes excessive loss in relation to what kind of
anticipated advantage. Blockades do not fit that model. They are relatively
rare and they can affect the entire population of the blockaded country or
area for months or years. Moreover, their effects intersect with numerous
other factors that will only become clear over time, including the policies of
the encircled authority, environmental and climatic events, and population

152. SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 38–46.
153. Id. ¶ 102.4 indicates that paragraph 102(b) covers proportionality and precautions,
but this appears to conflate the rules, as 102(b) includes none of the elements of IHL precautions.
154. Supporting such a reading of the applicability of some of the general principles,
one might point (for example) to paragraph 42, which forbids the employment of any
“methods or means of warfare” which are indiscriminate. Blockades are clearly a method of
warfare. They are also, however, almost inevitably indiscriminate.
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movements.155 All of this makes it far harder to evaluate with any precision
the civilian loss expected or the military advantage anticipated from an encirclement method.
Even assuming that this epistemic challenge were overcome in a given
case, the extraordinary scale of both the civilian loss expected in a blockade
(including, potentially, mass starvation) and the military advantage anticipated from it (including, potentially, total victory in the war) would bear no
relation to the scale of those factors in ordinary targeting operations, where
iterated practice has arguably established some rough sense of how to appraise these values in relation to one another.156 This is not to deny that various authorities have made, and will continue to make, assertions regarding
whether a particular blockade is or is not proportionate in the civilian harm
it inflicts. It is instead to call into question the degree to which such assertions are likely to garner the kind of consensus that would help to settle disputes.157
There is also a deeper normative question arising from the extended duration of blockades. How, if at all, should losses and damage already inflicted
be incorporated into a proportionality assessment regarding whether to continue a blockade? The question becomes particularly pointed when that continuation would mean extending the encirclement beyond the point at which
155. In the context of the Gaza blockade, disagreements have arisen even with respect
to the question of whether to consider the blockade in isolation from or together with the
Israeli closure of land access to the Gaza Strip. Russell Buchan, The Palmer Report and the
Legality of Israel’s Naval Blockade of Gaza, 61 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY 264, 270–71 (2012); Magne Frostad, Naval Blockade, 9 ARCTIC REVIEW ON LAW
AND POLITICS 195, 210 (2018); Palmer Report, supra note 133, ¶¶ 78–79.
156. For a relatively sanguine view of the determinacy of proportionality in ordinary
operations, see EMANUELA-CHIARA GILLARD, PROPORTIONALITY IN THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES: THE INCIDENTAL HARM SIDE OF THE ASSESSMENT ¶ 81 (Dec. 2018). Providing reasons for skepticism that proportionality can provide a clear restraint in even traditional targeting contexts, see Janina Dill, Assessing Proportionality: An Unreasonable Demand on
the Reasonable Commander?, INTERCROSS (Oct. 11, 2016), https://intercrossblog.icrc.org/
blog/r19aesa7v1kylcc5a4hbcwvfx8imus.
157. The issue of proportionality has come up in the context of the Gaza blockade,
with divergent results. For finding the blockade compliant with proportionality, see TURKEL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶¶ 88–96; Palmer Report, supra note 133, ¶¶ 78–81.
For finding the blockade to violate proportionality, see International Fact-Finding Mission,
supra note 133, ¶¶ 51–54; TURKISH NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, REPORT ON THE
ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOY TO GAZA ON 31 MAY 2010, at 68–
74 (2011), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Turkish%20Report%20Final%20-%20UN%20
Copy.pdf.
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success was anticipated in the original assessment.158 One approach would
consider past civilian casualties to be a form of sunk cost, such that a proportionality assessment regarding whether to continue would look only at
future projected damage and advantage—what Seth Lazar calls the “prospective view.”159 Another would deem the action (such as a blockade) disproportionate once it exceeds the civilian damage deemed disproportionate
at the start of the operation, irrespective of whether continuing now would
promise an advantage that far outweighs the civilian loss that is likely to be
incurred going forward—what Lazar calls the “quota view.”160 Lazar’s preferred third alternative—the “discount view”—would discount progressively (and asymptotically towards a lower limit) the weight of the legitimate
reasons for continuing with the operation as the costs incurred rack up over
time.161 Fundamentally, it is simply not clear as a matter of law how the proportionality of long-term and uncertain operations of this kind should be
assessed. Although this complication can come up in the context of proportionality in targeting, it features systematically in jus ad bellum proportionality
and in what Noam Lubell and Amichai Cohen have identified recently as
“strategic proportionality” issues in the jus in bello, including those arising in
a blockade.162 The lack of clarity on how to understand proportionality here
adds further to the layers of ambiguity discussed above.
Ultimately, although there is procedural value in having decision makers
confront the tradeoff between civilian loss and military advantage, the range
of internal, structural, and contextual infirmities in the 102(b) rule are such
that it is unlikely to do much to constrain the imposition of severe starvation
conditions in a siege or blockade. Certainly, the heightened indeterminacy of
the proportionality test in such situations weakens the capacity of the test to
provide the focal point for mobilizing the political will necessary to confront
a bad faith actor. As Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg puts it, proportionality
in this context “will only in exceptional cases result in a generally accepted
legal evaluation.”163 The force of humanitarian protection in the San Remo
framework thus shifts from the rules defining when it is lawful to impose a
blockade to those defining the lawful management of a blockade.
158. TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶ 96.
159. Seth Lazar, Moral Sunk Costs, 68 PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 844 (2018).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 848.
162. Noam Lubell & Amichai Cohen, Strategic Proportionality: Limitations on the Use of Force
in Modern Armed Conflicts, 96 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 159 (2020).
163. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockades and Interdiction, supra note 126, at 933.
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B. Humanitarian Constraints on the Management of Blockades
In the latter category, paragraph 103 of the Manual provides that if the civilian population of the blockaded territory is inadequately supplied with food
and other essential objects, the blockading party “must provide for free passage of such foodstuffs and other essential supplies,”164 subject to the right
to prescribe technical arrangements, including search, and to require that the
distribution will occur under the supervision of a Protecting Power or an
impartial humanitarian organization. Paragraph 104 provides that the blockading party “shall allow the passage of medical supplies for the civilian population or for the wounded and sick members of armed forces,”165 subject to
its right to prescribe technical arrangements, including search.
These rules avoid both the eviscerating narrowness of paragraph 102(a)
and the multilayered ambiguity of paragraph 102(b). Moreover, in contrast
to some interpretations of Article 70 of Additional Protocol I, they deny the
blockading party any discretion to refuse access when the encircled population is inadequately supplied.166 Indeed, the authors of the Explanation extol
paragraph 103 as a humanitarian advance on the treaty rule for precisely that
reason.167 One might even think that the requirements of paragraphs 103–4
of the Manual would preclude the infliction of starvation as the effect of a
blockade, thereby safeguarding the civilian population from the permissiveness of paragraph 102.168
However, the shift from rules prohibiting the imposition or continuation
of a blockade to rules regulating its management is significant. Even a blockade with humanitarian exceptions can cause mass starvation. Blockades deter
market supply. Technical arrangements such as inspections increase significantly the price of those goods that make it through, just as the broader
economic consequences of being cut off from the outside send entire populations into extreme poverty. Humanitarian relief is rarely sufficient to fill
the gap. It is for these reasons that the Saudi- and Emirati-led blockade of

164. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 103.
165. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 104.
166. See infra notes 205–211 and accompanying text.
167. SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 103.1–103.2.
168. For a related interpretation of Additional Protocol I, see, e.g., Gillard, supra note
145, at 11 (“Whatever position is adopted with regard to the scope of the prohibition of
starvation . . . . [i]f respected, [the rules on humanitarian access] will prevent starvation from
occurring.”).
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Yemen has brought the civilian population to the brink of famine, despite
allowing the passage of food.169
Such mass starvation does not occur by surprise. It is a process that becomes increasingly obvious over time.170 As Conley and de Waal put it, “No
modern famine has unfolded in silence.”171 Whatever the uncertainty regarding consequences at the beginning, at a certain point, continuing to impose
a blockade entails inflicting starvation with near certainty. And yet, as long
as there is a process for allowing essential objects through, this result could
be accepted and even intended as a core purpose without falling afoul of the
San Remo framework.
Further infirmities arise due to ambiguities regarding the implications of
the blockading party’s right to impose technical arrangements when allowing
the passage of relief supplies. Although similar issues arise in Articles 70 and
71 of Additional Protocol I, the problems may be particularly acute in the
San Remo context, due to the aforementioned weakness of the prohibitions
in paragraph 102.172 Two ambiguities stand out. First, neither paragraphs 103
and 104 nor the attached explanations offer any guidance on how the blockading party may react if there are reasons to believe that goods permitted
through would be used by hostile armed forces.173 Second, there is little guidance regarding the point at which technical arrangements that impose severe
delays or costs on those seeking to deliver the relief would become illegal. 174

169. Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶¶ 768–74, 795; Ferguson, supra note
5; Alex De Waal, Mass Starvation Is a Crime—It's Time We Treated It That Way, BOSTON REVIEW (Jan. 14, 2019), http://bostonreview.net/global-justice/alex-de-waal-mass-starvationcrime%E2%80%94its-time-we-treated-it-way. Similar patterns were observed regarding the
blockade of Iraq and Kuwait following the former’s invasion of the latter. Provost, supra
note 57, at 586–88. The same issues can arise in siege warfare. Griffin Paul Jackson, Starvation is a Weapon, SLATE (Sept. 12, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/09/starvation-war-crime-syria-yemen-icc.html. See also TURKISH NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, supra note 157, at 71.
170. On Yemen, see Fink, supra note 3, at 294.
171. Conley & de Waal, supra note 73, at 702.
172. AP I, supra note 63, arts. 70(3), 71(3).
173. The expectation that food and other essentials will be used by both combatants
and civilians is likely to be well founded in most blockade or siege scenarios. KJ Riordan,
Shelling, Sniping and Starvation: The Law of Armed Conflict and the Lessons of the Siege of Sarajevo, 41
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY WELLINGTON LAW REVIEW 149, 171 (2010).
174. Discussing this issue in the broader IHL context, see Yoram Dinstein, The Right to
Humanitarian Assistance, 53 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 77, 86 (2000); Akande & Gillard,
Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 774.
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On the first point (allowing or denying access), one reading would be
that the blockading party “must” and “shall” allow access whenever the trigger conditions apply (inadequate supply to civilians, or to civilians and persons hors de combat, respectively), regardless of the consequences of allowing
that supply.175 After all, there is no explicit discretion to deny access in such
circumstances. Another, however, might deem the blockading party’s right
to impose technical arrangements and require supervision to be manifestations of a deeper underlying right to ensure that essentials are allowed
through only if strictly humanitarian and destined exclusively for protected
persons.176 From that perspective, the fact that some of the goods will reach
combatants would be enough to deny access unless the consequences of that
denial would be disproportionate.177 Proportionality may also seem to be a
plausible rule for determining when the impact of technical arrangements
would be too great to warrant their imposition. On either front, however,
this would simply shift the work back to paragraph 102(b), with all of the
difficulties discussed above.
In sum, despite introducing several layers of humanitarian constraint into
the law of blockade, the San Remo framework remains surprisingly permissive, with potentially devastating consequences for the civilian population in
the blockaded territory. It allows purposive mass starvation. The proportionality restraint is isolated from a broader framework of bright-line rules and
175. TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶ 77 (defining paragraph 103 as
“identical” to the absolute obligation in Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).
176. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, supra note 90, ¶ 51 (“[T]he obligation to provide
for free passage of relief consignments is not absolute in character because relief consignments could be abused for military or other harmful purposes.”); Palmer Report, supra note
133, ¶ 80 (“[I]t does not follow from this obligation that the naval blockade is per se unlawful or that Israel as the blockading power is required to simply let vessels carrying aid
through the blockade. On the contrary, humanitarian missions must respect the security
arrangements put in place by Israel. They must seek prior approval from Israel and make
the necessary arrangements with it. This includes meeting certain conditions such as permitting Israel to search the humanitarian vessels in question.”).
177. Michael Schmitt, Kieran Tinkler & Durward Johnson, The UN Yemen Report and
Siege Warfare, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/66137/the-unyemen-report-and-siege-warfare/. Relatedly, see Riordan, supra note 173, at 176–77 (“Unless there are serious reasons to believe that they will be misused, the commander must
allow the free passage of all consignments of humanitarian aid and other essentials.”); Ruth
Abril Stoffels, Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflicts: Achievements and
Gaps, 86 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 515, 542 (2004) (if an “excessively
large portion of aid” is diverted to the opposition, then access could be denied”). See also
U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 62, § 5.19.2.
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applied in a context where its weaknesses as a restriction are maximally exposed. And the conduct rules in paragraphs 103 and 104 are unlikely to remedy these defects, particularly (though not exclusively) in contexts in which
it cannot be guaranteed that essential goods allowed through would be used
exclusively for the benefit of civilians.
IV.

THE ARGUMENT FOR A PERMISSIVE LAW OF BLOCKADE

Given these significant humanitarian vulnerabilities, one might question
whether the framework laid out in the San Remo Manual is compatible with
the move towards a firm prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare.
Part V makes the case that it falls short of the proper understanding of that
prohibition. Some, however, have taken the opposite view, arguing that restrictions such as those provided in the San Remo framework are, if anything, more demanding than existing IHL, including that codified in the Additional Protocols. On this view, in the context of encirclement, and particularly blockade, it remains lawful to starve the civilian population, including
by blocking humanitarian aid.
A. Special Permissions at Sea and the Law of Blockade
One version of this argument is specific to blockades. It rests on two core
claims. First, even if the provisions of Additional Protocol I (and any customary analogues) preclude encirclement starvation in land sieges, those
rules are inapplicable to naval warfare, including blockades. Second, the law
of naval warfare has long allowed for starvation in the specific context of
naval blockade and the San Remo drafters’ efforts to progressively develop
the law through paragraphs 102–4 of the Manual have not been successful in
reshaping State practice and opinio juris.
This blockade-specific argument places great weight on a combination
of the Commentary to Protocol I and a particular reading of Article 49(3) of
the Protocol, rooted in its relationship to the goal of some of the drafting
States, including France and the United Kingdom, to exclude blockades
from the rules on starvation and humanitarian access.178 Article 49(3) states,
178. Drew, supra note 13, at 314, 316; DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra
note 149, at 259. The UK’s Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict states both that there remains
“no opportunity for a besieging force to contribute in any way to civilian starvation” and
that the rules on humanitarian access do not affect the existing rules of warfare regarding
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The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which
may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on
land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against
objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air. 179

A committee rapporteur discussing what would become Article 54 during
drafting stated, “The fact that the paragraph [in Article 54] does not change
the law of naval blockade is made clear by Article [49].”180 The official Commentary to Protocol I states, without further explanation, that this observation
“appears to be correct.”181
On this view, the traditional law of blockade endured untouched by the
framework enshrined in Article 54 of Protocol I.182 As such, in their assessment of the law of blockade as “one of the few aspects of the law of naval
warfare which has been affected by the adoption of Additional Protocol I,”
the San Remo drafters would appear to have acted in error, thereby undermining the authority of the restrictions on blockades asserted in paragraph
102 of the Manual.183
The reliance of this argument on the final clause of Article 49(3) is significant in two respects. First, as ought to be apparent from a plain reading
of the text, it is a highly contestable interpretation. Indeed, as discussed in
Part V, it is ultimately untenable. Second, even assuming the British and
French reading of Article 49(3) were correct, it would render inapplicable to
blockades only those provisions of Additional Protocol I in the same section
of the treaty as Article 49. Article 54 falls into that category, but Article 70
does not. Thus, despite having accepted that Article 54 does not apply to
blockades, the official Commentary provides that

naval blockade, submarine warfare or mine warfare. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶¶ 5.34.2, 9.12.4 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL].
179. AP I, supra 63, art. 49(3).
180. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2092.
181. Id. See also id. ¶ 2114.
182. Drew, supra note 13, at 311–12; ERIC TALBOT JENSEN, GEOFFREY S. CORN, M.
CHRISTOPHER JENKS, RICHARD JACKSON & VICTOR HANSEN, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 446 (2014). See generally supra Part II.
183. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 102.19. Dinstein describes the Manual’s framework as “a
compromise of sorts” resulting from “intense discussion.” DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES, supra note 149, at 259.
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If the effects of the blockade lead to [starvation conditions], reference
should be made to Article 70 of the Protocol (Relief actions), which provides that relief actions should be undertaken when the civilian population
is not adequately provided with food and medical supplies, clothing, bedding, means of shelter and other supplies essential to its survival.184

The significance of that caveat depends on whether one accepts a narrow or
broad reading of Article 70. France and the United Kingdom issued reservations to Article 70 specifying that, for them, the provision does not apply to
naval blockade, submarine warfare, or mine warfare.185
B. Encirclement Starvation and a Permissive Reading of Additional Protocol I
The more comprehensive argument for the permissibility of encirclement
starvation does not rely on a blockade carve-out. Those taking this view note
that starvation sieges and blockades have long been part of the practice of
war,186 reason that “a clear intention would need to be expressed in a treaty
to abolish such a well-established practice,”187 and contend that no such clarity exists with respect to the rules in the Additional Protocols.188 The argument has four steps.
First, it is claimed that for the starvation of the civilian population to be
a “method” of warfare (as prohibited in paragraph 1 of Article 54), starvation

184. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2095.
185. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Reservation/ Declaration, ICRC,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NOR
MStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470 (United Kingdom ¶ (p); France, ¶ 17) (last visited
Jan. 25, 2021).
186. See supra Part II. Even critical analyses of encirclement starvation often begin with
the premise that “Blockades, sieges and siege-like warfare are not per se prohibited by international humanitarian law ….” Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 357.
187. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 140–41 (3d ed. 2012).
188. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 13, at 18–19, 26–33; Matthew C. Waxman, Siegecraft and
Surrender: The Law and Strategy of Cities and Targets, 39 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 353, 410 (1999).
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must be inflicted purposefully on the civilian population with a view to advancing the war effort.189 Civilian starvation arising as the collateral consequence of an otherwise lawful action would not meet that threshold.190 This
position is not quite the same as that of paragraph 102(a) of the San Remo
Manual in that it would seem to accept that the purposeful starvation of civilians is prohibited, even if it is not the only purpose. However, when interpreted narrowly and offered without the proportionality or humanitarian access requirements of the San Remo Manual (or with significantly diluted versions thereof), the overall effect may still be an even weaker regulatory system than is provided by the latter.
Significant authorities endorse the notion that the ban on starvation includes some form of purpose element. In its affirmation of the customary
status of the prohibition, the United States’ DoD Law of War Manual states
that the ban applies only to operations the purpose of which is to starve the
civilian population.191 Purposive language also arises in the military manuals
of other States, including some that are party to the First Protocol, as well as
in the HPCR Manual on Air and Missile Warfare.192 Perhaps more surprisingly,
189. Drew, supra note 13, at 314; Watts, supra note 13, at 18–19. One might point here
to the ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, which reasons “To use [starvation] as a
method of warfare would be to provoke it deliberately, causing the population to suffer
hunger, particularly by depriving it of its sources of food or of supplies.” COMMENTARY ON
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2089. See also id. ¶ 4791.
190. The UK Manual states, “The law is not violated if military operations are not intended to cause starvation but have that incidental effect, for example, by cutting off enemy
supply lines which are also used for the transportation of food” UK MANUAL, supra note
178, ¶ 5.27.1. See also AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS, ADDP 06.4, LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 5.37 (2006), https://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/documents/doctrinelibrary/addp/addp06.4-lawofarmedconflict.pdf [hereinafter ADDP 06.4].
191. U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 62, § 5.20.1 (recognizing starvation
to be banned when “specifically directed against the enemy civilian population. For example,
it would be prohibited to destroy food or water supplies for the purpose of denying sustenance to the civilian population”); § 17.9.2.1 (“It is only actions that are for the purpose of
starving civilians as a method of combat that are prohibited under this rule”). Much like the
San Remo Manual, the DoD Manual also incorporates a proportionality requirement into its
understanding of the prohibition of starvation. Id. § 5.20.2.
192. See, e.g., ADDP 06.4, supra note 190, ¶ 5.37 (but note id. ¶¶ 7.12, 9.32); UK MANUAL, supra note 178, ¶¶ 5.27.2, 5.34.3; HPCR MANUAL, supra note 11, r. 97, cmt. ¶ 2, r.
157(a). See also NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE, DM 112, INTERIM LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL, §§ 504(2) [including n. 9], 613(2) (1992) [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND INTERIM LOAC MANUAL]. Note, however, that the emphasis on specific purpose in the 1992
Interim Manual is not replicated in the 2019 Manual. 4 NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE,
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the ICRC in its study of customary IHL specifies that the “prohibition of
starvation as a method of warfare does not prohibit siege warfare as long as
the purpose is to achieve a military objective and not to starve a civilian population.”193 This language is often drawn upon by expert bodies.194
On the most limited reading of the starvation ban along these lines, it is
permissible to starve combatants through starving the entire population, civilian and otherwise, of the area within which they are encircled—or, in
terms used to describe the starvation tactics of the Derg in the 1980s in Ethiopia, to “drain[] the sea to catch the fish.”195 Sean Watts defends this position
on the grounds that, given the impossibility of ensuring discrimination in the
ultimate delivery of relief, any alternative interpretation would compel “besieging forces to alleviate starvation of . . . trapped enemy forces.”196 This
highly restricted understanding of purpose starts to resemble that of 102(a)
in the San Remo framework.
The second step of the argument for the permissibility of encirclement
starvation asserts that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 54 of Protocol I are
separate and distinct from the general prohibition on starvation as a method
of warfare in paragraph 1 of the provision.197 Recall that paragraph 2 prohibits certain forms of depriving the civilian population of objects essential to
their survival for the purpose of denying sustenance to the adverse party,
and paragraph 3 prohibits certain kinds of operations that do not have civilian starvation as their purpose but do cause civilian starvation or the forced
movement of the civilian population. Asserting that these provisions are distinct from the general prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare allows for a reading according to which their broader prohibition of incidental
DM (2 ed), MANUAL OF ARMED FORCES LAW: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT §§ 8.8.258.8.26(a, c) (2019) [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND LOAC MANUAL]. The one case in which the
Manual does invoke specific purpose is that of blockade, where the relevant provision replicates the San Remo Manual, including on the issue of proportionality. Id. §§ 8.8.26(b), 10.5.4.
193. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 70, r. 53.
194. Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶¶ 357, 511. The Report is not entirely
consistent on this point. See, e.g., infra note 311 and accompanying text.
195. Beth Van Schaack, Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians as a Weapon of War and
War Crime, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/29157/siege-warfare-starvation-civilians-war-crime/ (Quoting a Canadian war crimes investigation team rapporteur on Sarajevo lamenting: “One is left with the unpalatable fact that, unless there is a
neutral arbiter, the only way to starve out a besieged military force, a legitimate act of war,
is over the starved bodies of the civilian population.”).
196. Watts, supra note 13, at 19.
197. Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 761–65. But see
Akande’s and Gillard’s qualification of this in infra note 200.
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starvation is not incompatible with a purposive interpretation of paragraph
1.198 Alternatively, some have even challenged the natural reading of paragraph 3 (or its customary analogue), insisting that the ban on depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival should also be understood in
purposive terms.199
Third, it is argued that paragraph 2 of Article 54 provides an exhaustive
and narrowly defined list of the prohibited ways of depriving the civilian
population of objects indispensable to the survival of its members.200 Specifically, it prohibits attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless such
objects; any other mode of depriving the civilian population of access to

198. AFRICA WATCH, EVIL DAYS: THIRTY YEARS OF WAR AND FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA
141 (1991), cited in Marcus, supra note 2, at 257.
199. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 1110B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS § 8.3 (2017) (“The intentional destruction of food, crops, livestock, drinking
water, and other objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, for the specific
purpose of denying the civilian population of their use, is prohibited.” (emphasis added). See,
e.g., provisions in the military manuals of Australia, Ecuador, and New Zealand, cited in 2
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 89, r. 54, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter17_rule54. It is worth noting, however, that these positions are complicated by some potentially confounding other provisions
in the same law of war manuals. See, e.g., NEW ZEALAND INTERIM LOAC MANUAL, supra
note 192, § 504(3); 613(3). Moreover, as noted above, this focus on the specific purpose of
civilian starvation is dropped from the more recent New Zealand Manual, except for the
case of blockades, on which the New Zealand Manual simply follows the San Remo Manual.
NEW ZEALAND LOAC MANUAL, supra note 192, §§ 8.8.25-8.8.27. See also ADDP 06.4, supra
note 190, ¶¶ 7.12, 9.32.
200. This distinction is raised even by some who do not support a broad permission to
starve. Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 762–65. Importantly,
despite having identified the distinction between Article 54(1) and 54(2)–(3), Akande and
Gillard question the normative basis for this distinction and raise skepticism about whether
“method of warfare” really implies purpose. Id. at 765. In line with the San Remo Manual,
they also argue that proportionality provides a safeguard here (id.) and that humanitarian
access rules have the practical implication “that measures that can be expected to lead to
the starvation of civilians should not be imposed.” Id. at 768–69. They further indicate that
the requirement to distinguish between combatants and civilians and not to engage in indiscriminate attacks raises problems for starvation methods that are indiscriminate, irrespective
of purpose. Id. at 766. D’Alessandra and Gillett treat the case of an attack on indispensable
objects differently from that of an encirclement, focusing more on purpose in the latter case.
D'Alessandra & Gillett, supra note 68, at 827–29, 831–32. However, drawing on the ICRC
Commentary, they appear ultimately to take the view that an encirclement that causes starvation would be prohibited, regardless of purpose. Id. at 832.
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those objects remains permissible unless it falls afoul of the overarching prohibition in Article 54(1).201 Encircling an area and denying the passage of essential goods to the starving civilian population would not be prohibited by
paragraphs 2 and 3 because it involves blocking the delivery of objects indispensable to civilian survival, not attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless those objects.202 Even the most flexible of the action terms in the
provision (“rendering useless”) does not stretch easily to encompass siege or
blockade tactics.203
Fourth, the argument for an expansive permission to starve by encirclement rejects the utility of humanitarian access provisions in resolving the
infirmity of Article 54. Specifically, it is noted that Article 70 of Protocol I
provides that impartial humanitarian action shall be undertaken to relieve
inadequately supplied populations only “subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned.”204 The Protocol, the argument goes, imposes no limit on
concerned States’ discretion to withhold that consent.205 Therefore, States
may withhold consent in order to further their war aims through imposing a
comprehensive starvation siege.206 On this reading, the humanitarian access
obligations provided in paragraphs 103–4 of the San Remo Manual go beyond
the requirements of the Protocol or any reflection thereof in customary
law.207
Defending this interpretation, Watts notes that Article 70 lacks language
equivalent to that in Article 23 of Geneva Convention IV restricting the denial of relief to children, expectant mothers, and maternity cases to cases
when there are “serious reasons for fearing” the consequences outlined in
Part II (capacious as those are).208 As such, he argues, “it appears States were
only willing to abandon the GC IV limited scope of relief and protected
persons [for coverage of all civilians and a wider range of relief] in exchange
for discretion to permit or reject these broader relief actions during siege.”209
201. Drew, supra note 13, at 314.
202. Rogers, supra note 187, at 140–41.
203. The ICRC Commentary states, “With regard to rendering such objects useless, this
refers mainly to irrigation works and installations.” COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2100.
204. AP I, supra note 63, art. 70.
205. Drew, supra note 13, at 315; Watts, supra note 13, at 22–23.
206. Watts, supra note 13, at 4, 22–23.
207. The San Remo Manual drafters claim it moved the law forward from the Additional
Protocol rules. See SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 103.1–103.2.
208. Watts, supra note 13, at 22.
209. Id.
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Suggesting they agree that the Geneva Convention IV rule is not entirely
subsumed by the Protocol I rule, several States that are party to Protocol I
still incorporate the exceptions articulated in Article 23 of the Fourth Convention into their military manuals.210 Sassòli and Bouvier describe the Article 70 consent clause as a “severe limitation” in the Additional Protocol’s
protection of the civilian population’s right to humanitarian relief.211
C. Precautions as Authorizations
A final argument would flip the duty to allow civilians to exit the besieged
area from a cumulative constraint into a ground for reducing the protection
for those who remain. This controversial line of reasoning can supplement
either of the first two forms of argument outlined in this Part. Although
most obviously relevant in land sieges, an argument along these lines could
arise in the context of a naval blockade, and certainly in the context of a
combined land and naval encirclement.
As noted above, the recent U.S. recognition of the duty to allow civilian
exit roots that obligation in the general precautionary requirements of
IHL.212 This is not an uncommon line of reasoning,213 although some also
root the duty to allow egress in the obligation of parties to remove civilians
and civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives.214
In its ordinary application to attacks, the relevant precautions rule requires that belligerents take all feasible measures to minimize civilian loss.215
Transposed to the encirclement context, that might be thought to underpin
and entail both the duty codified in the San Remo Manual to allow essentials
through when the besieged (and legally protected) population is deprived and
a duty to allow fleeing civilians safe passage out of the besieged area, as well
as any other measures that would limit civilian damage.216
210. UK MANUAL, supra note 178, ¶ 9.12.
211. MARCO SASSÒLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?
182 (1999).
212. As noted above, the U.S. DoD Law of War Manual recognizes the besieging party’s
obligation not to force fleeing civilians back into the besieged area, deriving this from the
general requirement to take precautionary measures to minimize civilian loss. U.S. DOD
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 62, § 5.19.4.1.
213. Gillard, supra note 145, at 12.
214. AP I, supra note 63, art. 58; 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
supra note 70, r. 24; D'Alessandra & Gillett, supra note 68, at 831.
215. AP I, supra note 63, art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
216. SRM, supra note 10, ¶¶ 103–4.
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Some, however, argue that a besieging party that allows protected persons safe passage out of the besieged area thereby provides the justificatory
foundation for starving those that remain.217 For example, in analyzing situations in which civilians remain in the encircled area (whether by their own
accord or due to the requirements of the besieged party), the UK Manual of
the Law of Armed Conflict states, “so long as the besieging commander left
open his offer to allow civilians and the wounded and sick to leave the besieged area, he would be justified in preventing any supplies from reaching
that area.”218 Under this line of reasoning, what might have been thought to
be a cumulative obligation (one that adds to duties of discrimination, nonstarvation, allowing humanitarian access when there is an inadequate supply
of essentials, and so on) instead becomes the key underpinning of an authorization to starve civilians—seemingly overriding those other IHL duties.
In the traditional defense of this position, Spaight contends that when
the civilian population remains voluntarily, “[t]he solidarity between the
troops and the inhabitants of a fortified town . . . may almost be said to
deprive the latter, temporarily, of their non- combatant character.”219 More
recently, Dinstein asks, “if civilians in a besieged venue are offered a safe
passage out of an encircled area but choose to stay in situ, what lawful claim
do they have for special protection from the hardships of starvation?”220 This
may appear to bear some relation to a position advanced by some regarding
the status of voluntary human shields, although, for reasons discussed below,
the analogy is flawed in a number of ways.221
Others have argued that in the alternative case in which the encircled
party forces civilians to remain, responsibility for the latter’s suffering and
death would lie exclusively with that party, rather than with the encircling

217. Rogers, supra note 187, at 140–41 (N. B. Rogers drafted the UK MANUAL cited in
the next footnote); James Kraska, Siege, ¶ 21 (Dec. 2009), MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e407?rskey=fbUEBV&result=1&prd=MPIL.
218. UK MANUAL, supra note 178, ¶ 5.34.3.
219. J. M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 164 (1911). See also General Orders No.
100, supra note 16, art. 156 (justifying inflicting the “burden of war . . . on the disloyal citizens”).
220. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 149, at 255. Channeling
arguments to this effect, see George Alfred Mudge, Starvation as a Means of Warfare, 4 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 228, 236, 241 (1970).
221. See infra notes 339–353 and accompanying text.
353

International Law Studies

2021

party.222 This argument relies either on the besieged party’s broad duty to
take “necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting
from military operations,” including by removing civilians from areas of danger and avoiding the co-location of civilians and military objectives, or on its
narrower but stricter obligation not to use human shields.223
Along these lines, Watts argues that the besieged party’s failure on such
dimensions ought to “significantly alter[]” the evacuation and relief obligations of the besieging party. 224 In his view, “The fact that the besieged force,
not the besieging force, exercises immediate and direct control over the besieged area and its civilian population makes a compelling case for allocating
the balance of humanitarian responsibility to the former.”225 Parallel arguments have, of course, long been made in debates regarding the targeting of
military objectives in densely populated areas or situations in which the adversary is alleged to be using involuntary human shields.226 This, too, is addressed in the next Part.227
D. Proportionality Revisited
For reasons explored above, the proportionality rule articulated in paragraph
102(b) of the San Remo Manual is unlikely to be a significant constraint in
practice. For some advocates of the permissibility of encirclement starvation,
however, the provision is objectionable not because it offers too little in the
way of humanitarian protection, but because it demands too much of the
encircling party and (for reasons discussed in Part III) is not underpinned by
robust legal foundations.228
222. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 149, at 255–56. On the
long tradition of this line of reasoning, see Kraska, supra note 217, ¶ 7; Provost, supra note
57, at 618; Waxman, supra note 188, at 363. On the responsibility of the Bosnian government
for the impact on civilians of the Bosnian Serb siege of Sarajevo, see id. at 420.
223. AP I, supra note 63, arts. 58, 51(7).
224. Sean Watts, Under Siege: International Humanitarian Law and Security Council Practice
Concerning Urban Siege Operations 19 (Harvard Law School & Brookings Project on Law and
Security: Research and Policy Paper, 2014), http://blogs.harvard.edu/cheproject/files/
2013/10/CHE-Project-IHL-and-SC-Practice-concerning-Urban-Siege-Operations.pdf.
225. Id. at 12.
226. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW
1, 158–68 (1990).
227. See infra notes 339–353.
228. See supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text.
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Watts, for example, opposes the incorporation of a proportionality rule
into the law of siege starvation because it “greatly limits the militarily essential task of physically isolating enemy forces from life-sustaining supplies
when these forces are encircled along with civilians.”229 Drew is more sympathetic to the rule, arguing that by incorporating proportionality requirements into the Manual’s section on the law of blockade, the drafters (laudably) pushed the boundaries of lex ferenda.230 In his view, although this move
was sure to “invite backlash” from positivists, it was an effort that was in the
spirit (if not the clear text) of the First Protocol. 231 However, although the
move has gained traction in military manuals, Drew expresses skepticism
about its impact on hard State practice.232 The consequence of that final analysis would seem to be that retaining the San Remo provision on proportionality in the revised edition would continue to promote lex ferenda, after a quarter-century of the first such effort failing to gain traction. To put it another
way, Drew’s position implies that if the revision is to be faithful to customary
international law today, it will reverse the original edition’s incorporation of
proportionality as a failed effort to push the law forward. 233
E. Starvation and Military Necessity
The normative underpinning of the arguments for a broad permission to
starve is military necessity. Michael Walzer responds to those who might
question why civilian deaths can be inflicted by encirclement in ways that
would otherwise be prohibited, “The obvious answer is simply that the capture of cities is often an important military objective . . . and frontal assault
failing, the siege is the only remaining means to success.”234 Similarly, Waxman observes,

229. Watts, supra note 13, at 19.
230. Drew, supra note 13, at 317–20.
231. Id. at 320.
232. Id. at 319–20.
233. The original edition of the Manual purported primarily to “clarify” existing customary law. Louise Doswald-Beck, San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed
Conflict at Sea, 35 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 583, 586 (1995). However,
the mission did also include “some proposals for progressive development.” SRM, supra
note 10, at 61. It is unclear whether the revision would retain proposals for progressive
development if the experts were to determine that there had not been customary uptake in
the intervening decades.
234. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 162 (1977).
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siege methods have long been given leniency in customary law because they
were seen as the only viable means of securing certain military objectives. .
. . [Therefore,] the international community expressed a reluctance, even
among the strongest condemners of Serb practices [in the sieges of Sarajevo and Srebrenica], to accept the wholesale rejection of siege as a legitimate instrument.235

Similar arguments extend to naval warfare. As Heintschel von Heinegg puts
it, “blockade remains a most efficient method for subduing the enemy.”236
Along these lines, Dinstein has condemned Article 54 of Protocol I in
part because its posture on siege warfare is “untenable in practice, since no
other method of warfare has been devised to bring about the capture of a
defended town.”237 Less willing than Dinstein to accept the comprehensiveness of Article 54’s prohibition, Watts claims that “operationally troubling”238 efforts to interpret its rules to underpin an obligation on the part of
a besieging party to allow in humanitarian relief so as to avert starvation are
driven by a myopic “resort to humanitarian objects or purposes, without
equal attention to military necessity.” 239 For him, such interpretations fail to
take seriously the possibility that “permissive rules for withholding consent
to relief actions reflect not inadequacies but rather the presently-operative
balance between humanity and military necessity.”240 His claim is that anything short of total isolation (including on the dimension of humanitarian
aid) radically undermines the efficacy of siege warfare.241 The problem, from
this perspective, as Provost frames it, is that “when a shipment of food destined for the adverse country is intercepted, it is impossible to determine
whether the food will be used by civilians or by the military.”242

235. Waxman, supra note 188, at 421.
236. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, supra note 90, ¶ 27
237. Yoram Dinstein, Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians, in HUMANITARIAN LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 145, 151 (A.M. Delissen et al. eds., 1991); see
also DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 178, at 253–57. For a similar
view of Article 54 and its implications for the practice of siege warfare, see Kraska, supra
note 217, ¶¶ 10, 21.
238. Watts, supra note 13, at 6
239. Id. at 46.
240. Id. at 48.
241. Id.
242. Provost, supra note 57, at 617.
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A REBUTTAL

Critiques of the San Remo Manual’s humanitarian restrictions on blockades as
excessive are misplaced. Quite the opposite, the Manual’s weaknesses are
such that it fails to reflect the comprehensive prohibition of starvation in the
contemporary law of armed conflict. The starvation of civilians through encirclement deprivation is prohibited even if the operation has a military purpose, regardless of whether civilians are offered a path out, regardless of the
reasons that some do not exit the besieged or encircled location, and irrespective of the weight of the military advantage to be gained from breaking
the resistance of the encircled area. The ban is categorical. There is no exception for blockades.
A. The Fallacy of Blockade Exceptionalism
Consider the issue of blockade exceptionalism first. As discussed in the previous Part, the ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I indicates that the
starvation ban does not apply to blockades because Article 49(3) of Protocol
I stipulates that the relevant section of the treaty is not intended to “affect
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the
air.”243
Although oft-cited by proponents of a broad right to impose starvation
blockades, this interpretation flies in the face of the plain language of the
provision. Article 49(3) does not indicate that the law of naval warfare remains untouched by the rules protecting civilians from the effects of hostilities. On the contrary, it identifies two categories of naval warfare that are
impacted by those rules. Specifically, it states that the Protocol rules on protecting civilians from the effects of hostilities “apply to any land, air or sea
warfare which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from
the air against objectives on land . . . .”244 It is only with respect to aspects of
naval warfare falling outside of those two categories that the Protocol does
not “affect the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea
or in the air.” A naval blockade that imposes starvation conditions on the
civilian population on land is unambiguously a form of “sea warfare” that

243. See supra Section IV.A.
244. AP I, supra note 63, art. 49(3).
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“may affect the civilian population . . . on land.” As such, it is plainly within
the scope of Article 54.245
It is undeniable that the ICRC Commentary to Protocol I and at least some
of the drafters contradict this reading of the impact of Article 49(3) on the
reach of Article 54. However, neither commentaries nor drafting histories
are ordinarily thought sufficient to override a clear textual meaning.246 Far
from being interpretively radical for a legal authority to apply Article 54 to
the situation of a naval blockade, it is difficult to see how it could do anything
else without deviating radically from the plain meaning of Article 49(3).
Apart from the issue of how to interpret Additional Protocol I, there is
clear support for the customary prohibition of starvation in naval blockades.247 Consider, in this regard, the posture of the ICC Statute. As is clear
both from its general jurisdictional provisions and the Court’s analysis of the
MV Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, the ICC Statute applies in the naval domain.248 There is neither a general naval carve-out in the war crimes provisions nor a specific qualifier excluding blockades from the war crime of starvation.249 As such, the only way to deny the applicability of that crime to
blockades under the ICC regime would be to refer to the chapeau of Article
8(2)(b), which defines all of the listed war crimes as “serious violations of
the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the

245. See, e.g., Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 487, 554–55 (Dieter Fleck ed.,
2009).
246. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
247. Despite reaching divergent conclusions on the legality of the Israeli blockade of
Gaza, the various expert bodies tasked with evaluating the operation were unanimous in
affirming the applicability of the starvation ban to naval blockades. See sources cited in supra
note 133.
248. ICC Statute, supra note 111, art. 12(2)(a) (“In the case of article 13, paragraph (a)
or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are
Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court . . . the State of registration of [the] vessel or aircraft” upon which the crime was committed). For the first in a
long and continuing line of decisions on the Mavi Marmara incident (all of which depend
on this jurisdictional foundation in the context of war crimes investigations), see Situation
on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic, and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the Request of the Union of the Comoros to Review the
Prosecutor’s Decision Not to Initiate an Investigation, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/13,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_13139.PDF (July 16, 2015).
249. ICC Statute, supra note 111, art. 8; ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 74.
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established framework of international law,”250 and to argue that the underlying IHL regime does not prohibit starvation in naval warfare for the reasons already stated.251
Such a line of reasoning is difficult to sustain.252 Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) refers specifically to the denial of humanitarian aid, was drafted in a context in
which the applicability of some form of starvation ban to blockades had already been recognized in the San Remo Manual, and was agreed at a time when
the judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) had already demonstrated a willingness to break down formal classification categories when they lack a persuasive normative rationale. 253 Despite that context, States made no effort to exclude blockade from the war
crime of the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. It is hard to believe that this was due to widespread confidence that the chapeau of 8(2)(b)
would preclude the application of the crime to that context with such clarity
that nothing more needed to be said to qualify it.254 On the contrary, given
the clear lack of consensus in favor of such a preclusion, the ICC provision
would seem to apply straightforwardly to blockades. Moreover, precisely because of the relationship between the war crime and the underlying IHL rule,
the lack of any blockade exceptionalism at the ICC is a significant indication
of ICC States Parties’ understanding of the absence of any such exceptionalism in the underlying IHL rule.
250. ICC Statute, supra note 111, art. 8(2)(b).
251. This issue has caused controversy in the context of the ICC’s inclusion of intraforce rape as a war crime. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-196,
Judgment the appeal of Mr. Ntaganda against the “Second decision on the Defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9,” ¶¶ 46–51, 56–70 (June
17, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/04-02/06-1962;
Kevin Jon Heller, ICC Appeals Chamber Says a War Crime Does Not Have to Violate IHL,
OPINIO JURIS (June 15, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/06/15/icc-appeals-chamberholds-a-war-crime-does-not-have-to-violate-ihl/.
252. Calling into question the certainty of blockade law, see COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2093; MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, BLOCKADE LAW:
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SOURCES 8 (1991) (noting the “lack of codification” and evolving
nature” of the regime).
253. Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 120, ¶ 119.
254. Indeed, even while asserting the non-applicability of Article 54 over a decade earlier, the ICRC Commentary to Protocol I acknowledged, “[T]here is some uncertainty as regards the present state of the customary law relating to blockades. . . . [I]t is to be hoped
that the rules relating to blockades will be clarified . . . to duly take into account the principles
put forward in the Protocol which prohibit starvation as a method of warfare.” COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2093.
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The case for blockade exceptionalism in NIACs is even weaker. First,
there is currently no clarity regarding whether blockade law (and thus any
derivative exception to standard rules of IHL) applies in NIACs.255 Second,
regardless of one’s position on that debate, Article 13 of the Second Protocol
provides that the civilian protections contained therein “shall be observed in
all circumstances,”256 and the Commentary expresses none of the blockade exceptionalism found in the Commentary to Protocol I. Instead, it states that the
“use of blockade and siege as methods of warfare remain legitimate” under
Article 14 only “provided they are directed exclusively against combatants.”257
Recognizing the likely objection that this is incompatible with the very nature
of a blockade and thus an “unrealistic” constraint on the use of blockades,
the Commentary responds “as soon as there is a lack of indispensable objects,
the international relief actions provided for in Article 18 should be authorized to enable the obligation following from Article 14 to be respected.” 258
If naval blockade exceptionalism were to hold for IACs, it would be a rare
area of the law of war in which the restrictions on conduct in NIACs exceed
those applicable in IACs.
Ultimately, the San Remo Manual is correct to identify the starvation ban
as applicable in blockades (albeit that it defines the contours of that ban in
problematic ways, as detailed below). However, by excluding any mention of
the starvation ban from its general provisions, it could be read to imply that
the ban does not apply to other forms of naval encirclement or naval warfare
more broadly. On the narrower reading of the applicability of blockade law,
that would leave NIAC naval warfare unregulated by the starvation ban, even
though the applicability of the NIAC prohibition of starvation would seem
to be even less subject to debate than is the IAC prohibition.
B. Clarifying What Counts as the Purposive Starvation of the Civilian Population
If naval blockades are indeed governed by the rules of the Additional Protocols and their customary analogues, the key question is what those frameworks mean for the rules around starvation in the blockade context. One of
the areas of dispute identified above focuses on whether the proportionality
requirement in paragraph 102(b) of the San Remo Manual imposes a con-

255. See supra note 128 and infra notes 375–376, 386–387 and accompanying text.
256. AP II, supra note 64, art. 13(1).
257. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 4796.
258. Id. ¶ 4798.
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straint on blockades that exceeds the demands of existing customary international law, or whether it is instead a paper tiger that conceals an overly
permissive framework for the regulation of encirclement starvation. In the
background of that dispute is the issue of how to understand the role (if any)
of purpose in defining the primary starvation ban. The narrower the primary
ban, the greater the role for proportionality, and thus the greater the stakes
in the debate regarding the utility of proportionality as a constraint in the
blockade context. For that reason, it is important to start with the primary
prohibition.
Recall that some have seized on the use of the term “method” to infer
an element of purpose in that ban, as codified in treaty law in Articles 54(1)
of Additional Protocol I, 14 of Additional Protocol II, and 8(2)(b)(xxv) and
8(2)(e)(xix) of the Rome Statute.259 For reasons elaborated in the ensuing
Sections, that claim is unconvincing. However, even if one accepts arguendo
that the ban is limited to purposive civilian starvation, that proscription,
properly understood, would still be far broader than the “sole purpose” prohibition articulated in paragraph 102(a) of the San Remo Manual.260 Moreover,
outlawed by that additional breadth would be a range of blockades that
would not unambiguously violate the supplementary proportionality rule in
paragraph 102(b). In that sense, the invocation of paragraph 102(b) in the
San Remo Explanation’s defense of the extraordinary narrowness of 102(a)
is unpersuasive. On the specific issue of civilian starvation,261 the combination of the two paragraphs falls short of even a purposive interpretation of
the prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare, properly understood.
This becomes clear when one focuses on blockades imposed with the
goal of starving besieged combatants into submission. Such operations do
not aim exclusively to starve civilians, so they would avoid the ban articulated
in paragraph 102(a). As long as they promise great military advantage, such
blockades could also avoid unambiguous prohibition according to the terms
of paragraph 102(b). And yet, in most circumstances, such blockades would
clearly violate even a purposive interpretation of the prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare.
Encirclement deprivation aimed at starving out combatants depends typically on the denial of essentials to the entire population of the besieged or
blockaded area. It is only through the infliction of starvation conditions on
259. See supra notes 189–196 and accompanying text.
260. TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶ 75.
261. The issue of harm to the civilian population other than starvation is addressed
below. See infra notes 372–373 and accompanying text.
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that broader population that the besieging party has any chance to starve out
the combatants within.262 When the combatant population is starved through
the starvation of the population as a whole in this way, the latter overarching
policy, and not its ultimate objective, is the method of warfare. Put another
way, the ultimate goal of starving combatants in such a context entails a
predicate purpose of starving the population within which they are ensconced. The question, then, is how to understand the status of that broader
population.
Additional Protocol I reflects customary law in providing, “The presence
within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the
definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.”263 In its judgment in the case against Radovan Karadžić, the ICTY Trial
Chamber affirmed prior jurisprudence according to which “a population
may qualify as civilian as long as it is predominantly civilian,” holding on that
basis that “the population of the urban areas inside the confrontation lines
of Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995 had civilian status as a whole,” notwithstanding the existence of combatants in those areas.264 It is hard to imagine
a blockade aimed at starving out combatants, which would not need as its
predicate purpose the starvation of a civilian population thus defined. That
the commander may (or may not) lament the civilian suffering and death that
ensues has no bearing on whether this is the method of warfare pursued.265
As noted above, a number of authorities challenge the application of the
starvation ban to collateral or incidental civilian starvation.266 However, even
accepting that premise, civilian starvation as the predicate purpose necessary
for combatant starvation is clearly distinct from incidental civilian starvation,
properly understood. Examples of the latter would include destroying a
bridge essential both to the adversary’s supply of weapons or troops and to
262. Indeed, this is the premise of those who seek to argue for broad rights of encirclement starvation. Watts, supra note 13, at 7–16.
263. AP I, supra note 63, art. 50(3).
264. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, ¶ 4610 n.5510 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016). See also Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No.
IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 135–38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006); Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 50, 997 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 115 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004).
265. This is related to the distinction between motive and purpose, which arises in
paragraph 2 of Article 54. See infra notes 285–286.
266. See supra notes 189–196 and accompanying text.
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civilians’ supply of food, or possibly destroying fields of crops used by civilians for sustenance to prevent their parallel use “as concealment by the enemy.”267 Blockades that deprive encircled civilian populations of essentials
with a view to starving out the adversary within are not in that category. They
starve civilian populations purposefully in order to starve combatants.
Notably, the ICRC Commentary to Article 14 of the Second Protocol
(which bans “starvation as a method of combat”) states, “up to now there has
been no express rule of law forbidding besieging forces to let civilians die of
starvation.”268 Following the ban on starvation, however, the Commentary reasons, the use of blockade and siege warfare remain legitimate only if “they
are directed exclusively against combatants.”269 As such, in the aftermath of
the ban on starvation, military necessity cannot be “used to justify starving
the civilian population.” 270 The Commentary emphasizes the link to Article 54
of the First Protocol, particularly concerning the first paragraph (which bans
starvation as a method of warfare), terming Article 14 of Protocol II “a simplified version” of the Protocol I rule.271
An interpretation that would allow the practice of starving combatants
through starving the civilian population would also contradict core principles
of IHL. In the first instance, it would seem to fall afoul of the general injunction in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I that parties must “at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”272 It would also be in deep normative
tension with the rules prohibiting indiscriminate attacks. The latter prohibit
the use of a “method or means of combat which [are not or which] cannot
be directed at a specific military objective.”273 Even assuming the latter prohibition does not apply directly to blockades (insofar as the latter are not
267. Using genuine examples of incidental civilian starvation along these lines, see U.S.
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 62, § 5.20.4; UK MANUAL, supra note 178, ¶ 5.27.2;
Ministry of Defence, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict with Reference to
the Swedish Total Defence System § 3.2.1.5 (1991); 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 89, r. 54, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/
docs/v2_cha_chapter17_rule54; MICHAEL BOTHE, JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF,
NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 339 (2013).
268. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 4797 (emphasis added).
269. Id. ¶ 4796 (emphasis added).
270. Id. ¶ 4798.
271. Id. ¶ 4792.
272. AP I, supra note 63, art. 48 (emphasis added).
273. Id. art. 51(4)(a–b).
363

International Law Studies

2021

“attacks” in the strict sense),274 there is a profound dissonance between an
interpretation of Article 54 that would allow belligerents to starve indiscriminately and comprehensively the population of an encircled zone and the
clear rule precluding them from subjecting the very same area to comprehensive bombardment. 275 In fact, as argued in the ensuing Sections, far from
weakening these general restrictions on the conduct of hostilities, the starvation ban supplements them with a heightened categorical prohibition.276
Before turning to the case against a purposive understanding of the prohibition of starvation as a method of war, note two preliminary implications
of the argument thus far for the San Remo Manual. First, the argument exposes a gap left by paragraph 102 of the Manual. Even a purposive understanding of the starvation ban, properly understood, would prohibit starvation blockades that would be permitted under paragraph 102, because they
have at least one military purpose and because the military advantage they
promise would be sufficient to at least muddy any proportionality analysis.
Second, the argument here would clarify the ambiguity in paragraphs 103–4
on whether the blockading party’s obligation to permit the passage of essential goods to deprived populations holds even when the exclusive delivery of
those supplies to civilians cannot be guaranteed. The preliminary implication
of the discussion thus far is that, even on a purposive understanding of the
ban on starvation, the free passage of essentials is required even if the technical arrangements permitted are insufficient to ensure exclusive civilian delivery. Interpreting paragraphs 103–4 to the contrary would erroneously presume the legality of starving combatants through starving the civilian population within which they are ensconced.
C. The Ban on Starvation is not Limited to Purposive Starvation
The argument above accepts the premise that the starvation ban precludes
only encirclements imposed with the purpose of starving civilians. It shows
that even if that were correct, the San Remo Manual is overly permissive. The
premise, however, is mistaken. In addition to relying heavily on a very specific reading of an ambiguous term, it construes the general prohibition of
274. See supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text.
275. AP I, supra note 63, art. 51(5)(a). On the possible distinction, see Gillard, supra note
145 at 5, 8.
276. In work currently in progress, I argue that this heightened protection is best understood as rooted in the torturous wrong at the heart of starvation tactics. Tom Dannenbaum, Siege Starvation: A War Crime of Societal Torture (on file with author).
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starvation in treaty law in artificial isolation from its context, most notably,
the subsequent paragraphs of Article 54 of Additional Protocol I.
The term “method of warfare” is not defined in Additional Protocol I
or in prior law of war treaties. The Commentary to Protocol I provides only,
“The term ‘means of combat’ or ‘means of warfare’ generally refers to the
weapons being used, while the expression ‘methods of combat’ generally refers to the way in which such weapons are used.”277 The focus on weapon
use in that definition is neither particularly clarifying nor accurate. Various
tactics are specifically designated as methods in the Protocol, despite involving no direct use of weapons, including, for example, the improper use of
emblems and the denial of quarter, as well as starvation itself.278
What, then, is the meaning of “method of warfare” in such contexts? As
outlined in Part IV, one way of making sense of the term in article 54(1)
would be to understand it to limit the prohibition to operations that have the
starvation of civilians as their purpose. A more capacious view, however,
would hold that the term “does no more than describe conduct that is part
of hostilities.”279 To evaluate which end of this interpretive spectrum is more
compelling, the prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare must be
evaluated in context.280
This entails interpreting Article 54(1) in light of Article 54 as a whole. As
the ICRC Commentary notes, paragraph 2, which prohibits various forms of
the deprivation of objects indispensable to civilian survival “develops the
principle formulated in paragraph 1 of prohibiting starvation of the civilian
population; it describes the most usual ways in which this may be applied.” 281
This relationship between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 54 is also reflected
in the ICC Statute, which criminalizes the “starvation of civilians as a method
of warfare” (drawing on the language of Article 54(1) of the First Protocol),
specifying that such starvation occurs “by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival” (thereby drawing on the language of the second
277. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 1957.
278. Gloria Gaggioli & Nils Melzer, Methods of Warfare, in OXFORD GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 235 (Dapo Akande & Ben Saul eds., 2020)
279. Wayne Jordash, Catriona Murdoch & Joe Holmes, Strategies for Prosecuting Mass Starvation, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 849, 862 (2019); Global Rights
Compliance & World Peace Foundation, The Crime of Starvation and Methods of Prosecution and
Accountability, Accountability for Mass Starvation: Testing the Limits of the Law, ¶ 78 (Policy Paper
#1 2019).
280. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 246, arts. 31–32.
281. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2098; see also
Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 742.
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paragraph of Article 54).282 Indeed, the only objective non-contextual element of the crime of starvation as a method of warfare in the ICC system is
that the perpetrator “deprived civilians of objects indispensable to their survival.”283 Much like the Protocol’s Commentary, then, the Rome Statute understands the deprivation of objects indispensable to civilian survival to be
the operationalization of starvation as a method of warfare. This is indicative
of how parties to the ICC Statute understand their concomitant IHL obligations.284
In reading Article 54 coherently, three key features of paragraphs 2 and
3 warrant attention. First, those paragraphs preclude a narrow purposive
reading of the core starvation prohibition. Second, they, in fact, preclude an
interpretation according to which the starvation of civilians is permissible as
a collateral effect of the deprivation of objects indispensable to their survival.
Finally, these implications are not limited to a narrow definition of attacking,
destroying, removing, or rendering useless such objects. The first two points
are addressed in this Section; the third is elaborated in the next. As such, this
Section does not distinguish between deprivation of indispensable objects
by kinetic destruction and deprivation by encirclement and denial. Specific
issues relating to encirclement are addressed in the ensuing Sections.
The first point is straightforward. Article 54(2) provides, “It is prohibited
to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population . . . for the specific purpose of denying them
for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party,
whatever the motive . . . .”285 This leaves no question that attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless such objects is prohibited even if denying
their sustenance value to the civilian population is not the purpose. It is
enough that the purpose is denying their sustenance value to the adverse
Party. The provision also leaves no doubt that the motive for that denial is
irrelevant.286
282. ICC Statute, supra note 111, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxv), 8(2)(e)(xix).
283. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 74, at 31.
284. Both the IAC and NIAC starvation crimes are enshrined in the Rome Statute as
“serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in [international armed conflict or
armed conflicts not of an international character, respectively], within the established framework of international law.” ICC Statute, supra note 111, arts. 8(2)(b), 8(2)(e).
285. AP I, supra note 63, art. 54(2) (emphasis added).
286. Emphasizing this point, see Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission
on the Gaza Conflict, ¶ 934, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009) (“[T]he motive for
denying sustenance need not be to starve the civilian population. Indeed, the motive is irrelevant.”).
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Paragraph 3 then provides an exception to and an expansion of that
broad prohibition. The exception stipulates that the ban shall not apply when
the objects are used by the adverse party “as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces.”287 Plainly, then, objects used by that party as sustenance for members of the armed forces and civilians are covered by the
ban. The expansion stipulates that the ban does not apply if the objects are
used “not as sustenance” but “in direct support of military action, provided,
however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which
may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food
or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.”288 Thus, even when
the expected starvation of civilians would be genuinely incidental, in some
of the ways discussed previously (i.e., because the deprivation of the objects
indispensable to their survival would occur for military reasons other than
denying their sustenance value) that action would still be legally prohibited
simply because it is expected to cause starvation.289 Indeed, it would be
banned even if they might be expected to escape starvation by fleeing the
starvation conditions imposed upon them. The only remaining incidental
starvation that would appear to remain legally possible would be that occurring as the result of action that does not involve the direct deprivation of
essential objects, but which has that effect as one of its downstream consequences.
The Commentary to Protocol II indicates a similarly comprehensive understanding of the prohibition in Article 14 of that treaty, noting that the
“prohibition would be meaningless if one could invoke the argument that
members of the government's armed forces or armed opposition might
make use of the objects” and stipulating that
if the objects are used for military purposes by the adversary, they may
become a military objective and it cannot be ruled out that they may have
to be destroyed in exceptional cases, though always provided that such action
does not risk reducing the civilian population to a state of starvation.290
287. AP I, supra note 63, art. 54(3)(a) (emphasis added).
288. Id. art. 54(3)(b) (emphasis added); see also Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food
Insecurity, supra note 72, at 764.
289. Provost, supra note 57, at 604; Allen, supra note 13, at 62; Antonio Coco, Jérôme
de Hemptinne & Brian Lander, International Law Against Starvation in Armed Conflict: Epilogue
to a Multi-faceted Study, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 913, 921 (2019).
On genuinely incidental starvation, see supra notes 266–267.
290. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶¶ 4806–7 (emphasis added).
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Although Israel is party to neither Protocol, the Israeli Military Advocate
General’s Corps manual adopts a similar understanding of the analogous
customary rule.291
Ultimately, paragraph 3 of Article 54 clarifies that ordinary precautions
and proportionality are not sufficient in the context of starvation. In this
way, it adopts a posture significantly more prohibitive than either the San
Remo Manual or any of the positions considered in Part IV. It treats starvation
as a qualitatively different kind of civilian harm, requiring a distinct legal
framework of protection from that by which civilians are ordinarily protected under IHL.292
Ordinarily, under Article 52 of Protocol I, an object that contributes effectively both to civilians and to military action—a so-called “dual-use object”—would qualify as a military objective.293 Rather than precluding the
attack as a matter of distinction or discrimination, the civilian damage one
might expect from the destruction of such an object would be prohibitive
only if disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated, or if adequate
precautions for its minimization had not been taken.294
Absent Article 54, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population that also contribute to military action (whether by providing sustenance to the armed forces or otherwise) would clearly fall into the category
of a dual-use object. As such, they would qualify as a military objective (and
thus be legitimate targets) but would be protected by the precautions and
proportionality rules. If that were the way Protocol I sought to treat such
objects, there would be no need for Article 54, other than to confirm explicitly what is already provided in general terms in Article 52. Such redundancy
is plainly not what was intended. The working group charged with developing what became Article 54 at the Diplomatic Conference deemed it “one of

291. SCHOOL OF MILITARY LAW, MILITARY ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, RULES OF
WARFARE ON THE BATTLEFIELD 25 (2d ed. 2006).
292. In work currently in progress, I argue that this distinctive treatment is warranted
in light of the torturous impact of starvation methods. Dannenbaum, supra note 276.
293. AP I, supra note 63, art. 52(2). See also DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES,
supra note 149, at 120–25.
294. AP I, supra note 63, arts. 51(5)(b), 57.
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the most important articles of humanitarian law.” 295 The Soviet representative described its Protocol II analogue in Article 14 as “one of the most humane provisions” in the law of armed conflict.296
Rather than confirming the Article 52 framework for the specific situation of objects indispensable to civilian survival, the function of Article 54 is
instead to divert the deprivation of such objects into a more restrictive
framework. In paragraph 2, it issues a prohibition on attacks against objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population that is unqualified by
the ordinary dual-use principles. In paragraph 3, it introduces exceptions to
that primary ban, which are far narrower than the ordinary dual-use rule, and
which clearly preclude any attack on such objects that would have the consequence of starving the civilian population. That prohibition is prior to
questions of proportionality and precautions. It prohibits action irrespective
of the military advantage anticipated or the civilian loss minimization
measures undertaken.297 The only exception to its application is the narrow
scorched-earth exception in paragraph 5. Appropriately, then, in contrast to
those that attempt to qualify the prohibition with reference to purpose, most
military manuals simply provide in unequivocal terms that objects indispensable to civilian survival may not be destroyed.298
D. Starvation by Encirclement is Not More Permissible than Starvation by Attack
The question that remains is what this means for deprivation by encirclement
methods, rather than via operations that “attack, destroy, remove or render
useless” objects indispensable to civilian survival.299 As discussed above,
those who argue for an expansive right to engage in starvation sieges and
blockades point to the use of those terms in paragraph 2 as the reason not
to apply the approach of paragraphs 2 and 3 to encirclement starvation.
295. Summary Record of the Thirty-first Meeting, Doc. CDDH/III/SR.31 (Mar. 14,
1975), 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 67, at 300, ¶ 8. See also COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶¶ 2087–88.
296. Statement of the USSR Representative, Doc. CDDH/SR.52 (June 6, 1977), 7 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 67, at 136, ¶ 84.
297. Akande & Gillard, supra note 72, at 767 (“Article 54(3) AP I appears to modify or
‘displace’ the rule of proportionality with regard to measures that fall within the list of prohibited activities referred to in Article 54(2)”). As noted above, Akande and Gillard are less
sure whether this extends to measures taken to starve combatants other than those identified
in 54(2). See supra note 200.
298. See 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 89, r. 54.
299. See supra notes 200–203 and accompanying text.
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However, regardless of how narrowly one reads the language and direct application of paragraphs 2 and 3, this position cannot make sense of Article
54 as a whole. If the meaning of starvation as a method of warfare were to
incorporate a purposive element vis-à-vis starving civilians, in what sense
could paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 54 (which clearly prohibit the non-purposive infliction of starvation conditions on the civilian population) be understood to be manifestations of the general prohibition in paragraph 1? In
what sense, could they be, as the ICRC Commentary puts it, the “usual ways
in which [the prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare] may be applied”?300 If they are elaborations of that prohibition, the fact of their application to the non-purposive infliction of starvation conditions cannot but be
relevant to interpreting the meaning of the 54(1) prohibition, including as
applied to encirclement methods.
One way to make sense of the provision as a whole would be to interpret
“starvation as a method of warfare” as the deliberate deprivation of objects
indispensable to civilian survival, rather than as the final infliction of a particular impact on civilian victims.301 In one sense, that would track the language of the ICC Statute in focusing on such deprivation, and not the final
outcome, as the crux of the starvation method.302 Along these lines, the
Group of Experts on Yemen reasoned on the specific issue of what constitutes a method of warfare that “in order for starvation—defined as the deprivation of essential items for the survival of the population—to be considered as an international humanitarian law violation, it has to be used as a strategy to defeat
the other party to the conflict.”303 Engaging in the deprivation of objects
essential to civilian survival as a strategy to defeat the other party is entirely
compatible with lacking the purpose of inflicting a particular form of suffering or harm on the civilian population. Indeed, it would encompass relatively
straightforwardly within Article 54(1) the kinds of actions prohibited in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 54.

300. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 73–74. But see TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶ 78
(specifically distinguishing starvation from the deprivation of objects essential to civilian
survival).
302. Supra note 283. On the other hand, the differentiation between the deprivation of
objects indispensable to civilian survival and the starvation of civilians in the Elements of
Crimes might be thought to complicate such a reading. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note
74, at 31.
303. Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 741 (emphasis added); see also Jordash,
Murdoch & Holmes, supra note 279, at 862.
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Understanding the ban in this way would also call into question the notion that there is a deep qualitative distinction between deprivation by encirclement and deprivation by destruction, attack, removal, or rendering useless. If starvation as a method of warfare is the deprivation of objects essential to civilian survival as a strategy to defeat the other party, the question of
whether it has as its purpose the infliction of a particular kind of suffering
on the affected civilians is as irrelevant to deprivation by encirclement as it
clearly is to deprivation by attack, destruction, removal, or rendering useless
under the terms of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 54. Supporting this view,
the Commentary to the Second Protocol states of the use of the latter terms in
Article 14:
[C]ertain acts are emphasized, but the list is not exhaustive. Starvation can
also result from an omission. To deliberately decide not to take measures
to supply the population with objects indispensable for its survival in a way
would become a method of combat by default, and would be prohibited
under this article.304

Drawing a direct connection between the earlier (relatively weak) requirements of Article 23 of Geneva Convention IV and the starvation provisions
of the Protocols,305 the Commentary goes on to address the question of
whether blocking humanitarian aid would implicate the starvation ban, asserting,
If the survival of the population is threatened and a humanitarian organization fulfilling the required conditions of impartiality and non-discrimination is able to remedy this situation, relief actions must take place. In fact,
they are the only way of combating starvation when local resources have
been exhausted. . . . [A] refusal would be equivalent to a violation of the
rule prohibiting the use of starvation as a method of combat.306

Developments since the entry into force of the Protocols are also relevant here. In Resolution 2417, the Security Council, “Strongly condemns the
unlawful denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supply and
access for responses to conflict-induced food insecurity in situations of
304. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 4800.
305. Id. ¶ 4793.
306. Id. ¶ 4885.
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armed conflict, which may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law.”307
Similarly, Articles 8(2)(b)(xxv) and 8(2)(e)(xix) of the ICC Statute criminalize “using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them
of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief
supplies.”308 For the 123 States Parties to the Rome Statute, then, impeding
humanitarian aid can count as using starvation as a method of warfare (the
focus of Article 54(1) of Protocol I) because it is a form of depriving civilians
of objects indispensable to their survival (the focus of Article 54(2)). As emphasized above, this is indicative of those States Parties’ understanding of
the underlying law of armed conflict.309 In the proposal that led to the unanimously approved amendment incorporating the NIAC crime of starvation,
Switzerland reasoned that “a refusal to grant consent [to humanitarian relief]
‘without good grounds’ is equivalent to a violation of article 14” of Protocol
II.310
Along the same lines, authorities such as the International Commission
of Inquiry on Libya and the Group of Experts on Yemen have indicated that
encirclement deprivation can violate the prohibition of starvation as a
method of warfare through knowingly causing civilians to starve. 311 The
Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan also appears to eschew a

307. S.C. Res 2417, ¶ 6 (May 24, 2018). See also id. ¶ 10 (urging States to investigate
“violations of international humanitarian law related to the use of starvation of civilians as
a method of warfare, including the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance to the civilian
population in armed conflict”).
308. ICC Statute, supra note 111, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxv), 8(2)(e)(xix). The IAC provision references the impediment of relief supplies “as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.”
As Akande and Gillard have noted, this framing is slightly odd, given that the starvation ban
is provided in Additional Protocol I, which also has more comprehensive rules on humanitarian access. Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 772 n.53.
Some have suggested the language is meant to incorporate Additional Protocol I, too. Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 402 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002); D'Alessandra
& Gillett, supra note 68, at 839. Notably, the NIAC crime includes no reference to the Conventions.
309. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
310. Switzerland Non-paper, supra note 112, ¶ 12.
311. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, annex I, ¶ 542 n.802,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/68 (Mar. 8, 2012); Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶¶
744–48, 791. The Yemen Report is not entirely consistent on the issue of purpose. Id. ¶¶
357–58, 511, 777.
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purposive understanding of the ban on starvation by encirclement, which it
treats no differently from deprivation by destruction or pillage.312
Given this context, it is incumbent on those who would distinguish encirclement to explain what would justify its differential treatment. One might
argue that encirclement starvation tactics are appropriately the subject of less
stringent restriction than are kinetic attacks because they harm civilians only
on a slower, incremental timeline.313 Indeed, encirclement and denial tactics
are structured precisely so as to succeed before the entire encircled population
is wiped out, thereby avoiding the outcome they threaten. The point of a
siege or blockade is to stimulate capitulation before it causes starvation or
famine. The stretched temporal horizon of the encirclement method allows
those impacted the time to react and respond so as to avoid the ultimate
harm.
This, however, is not a plausible distinction. Whatever the validity of
distinguishing slow from quick inflictions of death and human suffering,314
that distinction does not differentiate between different kinds of starvation
tactics. Whether starvation is caused by destroying crops or by encircling and
denying their transfer to a particular population, the impact is equally slow
and torturous. In either case, it is possible that the surrender of the affected
party could alleviate it. And, in either case, allowing through humanitarian
aid could avert it for the population reached by that aid. If it is prohibited to
destroy foodstuffs whenever they are not used exclusively for the sustenance
of combatants (irrespective of the military advantage promised), why would
312. See generally Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, supra note 116. Implicitly eschewing a purposive interpretation, see id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 105. For more on how to understand the report, see Tom Dannenbaum, A Landmark Report on Starvation as a Method of Warfare, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73350/a-landmark-report-on-starvation-as-a-method-of-warfare/.
313. To be clear, kinetic attacks may have reverberating effects that percolate on a
longer time horizon. See, e.g., Ellen Nohle & Isabel Robinson, War in Cities: The ‘Reverberating
Effects’ of Explosive Weapons, HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY BLOG (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/03/02/war-in-cities-the-reverberating-effects-of-explosive-weapons/; Ian Henderson & Kate Reece, Proportionality under International
Humanitarian Law: The “Reasonable Military Commander” Standard and Reverberating Effects, 51
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 835 (2018). Nonetheless, a kinetic attack
is characterized primarily by the instantaneousness of its impact.
314. Cf. ROBERT NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE
POOR (2011); Ioannis Kalpouzos & Itamar Mann, Banal Crimes Against Humanity: The Case of
Asylum Seekers in Greece, 16 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2015). In
forthcoming work, I argue that the slow infliction of suffering via starvation tactics is an
important feature of its torturous wrong. Dannenbaum, supra note 276.
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it be permitted to deprive those combatants of the same food by encirclement if the deprivation would also impact civilians? If it is prohibited to destroy those crops when they are used for military purposes other than sustenance if the consequence would be the starvation or forced movement of
civilians, why would it be permitted to encircle the same population with the
same effect? The answer cannot refer to the immediacy of the initial destruction. That same immediacy applies to the destruction of objects protected
under Article 52 of Additional Protocol I and the corollary customary rule.
What distinguishes objects protected under Article 54 is their essential value
to the humans who depend on them. Indeed, Article 54(2) is not concerned
at all with the objects for their own sake—it is violated equally whether they
are removed (and thus maintained in both their form and future utility) or
destroyed. The special concern for, and protection of, the objects is derived
instead from their essential value to specific populations. The denial of that
value is indistinguishable whether the object is destroyed or obstructed from
delivery. What, then, would be the justification for treating encirclement deprivation differently from any other form of deprivation?
Ultimately, an interpretation of 54(1) and the concomitant customary
rule that is not limited to actions pursued with the purpose of inflicting starvation conditions on civilians and that does not treat encirclement deprivation differently from deprivation of other kinds is superior. It makes better
sense of the structure of Article 54 as a whole and it rests on a more normatively coherent foundation.
E. Humanitarian Access and Starvation
Related to the question of how to interpret Articles 54 and 14 on the issue
of humanitarian relief is the question of how to understand the humanitarian
access provisions in Articles 70 and 18 of Protocols I and II, respectively.
Here, the key issue is whether language rendering access “subject to the
agreement” of concerned parties entails that besieging belligerents have an
unfettered right to block those seeking to deliver humanitarian assistance to
the encircled population.
The ICRC commentaries deny that discretion on this issue is unlimited.
The Protocol I Commentary asserts that “a Party refusing its agreement must
do so for valid reasons, not for arbitrary or capricious ones.”315 The Protocol
II Commentary is more specific, adding, “If the survival of the population is
315. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2805.
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threatened and a humanitarian organization fulfilling the required conditions
of impartiality and non-discrimination is able to remedy this situation, relief
actions must take place. . . . The authorities . . . cannot refuse such relief
without good grounds.”316
Recently, a reading along these lines has been given lengthier elaboration
in the Oxford Guidance on the Law Relating to Humanitarian Relief Operations in
Situations of Armed Conflict, commissioned by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and drafted by Dapo Akande and EmanuelaChiara Gillard.317 It follows a number of authorities that have reached a similar conclusion, many of them channeling the understanding of a broad range
of States.318 As the textual basis for denying unfettered State discretion on
this issue, the Oxford Guidance emphasizes a key terminological shift from
Article 10 of Geneva Convention IV (also common Article 9 of Conventions
I–III) to Articles 70 of Protocol I and 18 of Protocol II. Whereas the language in Geneva Convention IV provides that an impartial humanitarian organization “may” undertake humanitarian action “subject to the consent of
the party concerned,”319 Article 70 of Protocol I provides that relief actions
for inadequately supplied civilians “shall be undertaken subject to the agreement of the parties concerned” and Article 18 of Protocol II provides similarly that relief “shall be undertaken subject to the consent” of the State concerned whenever the civilian population is suffering “undue hardship.”320
The linguistic shift from 1949 to 1977, it is claimed, indicates the introduction of a limit on State discretion with respect to allowing humanitarian access during armed conflict—namely, the denial of consent may not be arbitrary.321
316. Id. ¶ 4885.
317. AKANDE & GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 87, ¶¶ 43–49.
318. G.A. Res, 68/182, ¶ 14, Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,
(Dec. 18, 2013); Human Rights Council Res. 29/13, ¶ 1, Mission by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to Improve Human Rights, Accountability,
Reconciliation and Capacity in South Sudan, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/29/13 (July 2, 2015);
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the
Sudan, ¶ 8(f), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SDN/CO/4 (Aug. 19, 2014); Institut de Droit International, Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance art. VIII (Sept. 2, 2003); Francis M. Deng
(Representative of the Secretary-General), Report Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolution
1997/39, annex, princ. 25(2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998).
319. GC IV, supra note 46, art. 10.
320. AP I, supra note 63, art. 70(1) (emphasis added); AP II, supra note 64, art. 18(2)
(emphasis added).
321. AKANDE & GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 87, ¶¶ 45–47; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2805.
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Arbitrariness, of course, is a difficult standard to apply.322 In an effort to
concretize the requirement, the Oxford Guidance specifies several factors that
ought to inform its determination.323 These include whether it would violate
other obligations to the civilian population, whether it would be unnecessary
or disproportionate, and whether it would lead to injustice or to a lack of
predictability, or would otherwise be inappropriate.324 Among these grounds
for a finding of arbitrariness, denying access in a context in which starvation
would result ought to be one of the least controversial, precisely because it
is the natural implication of the ban enshrined elsewhere in the two protocols.325 If there is an arbitrariness threshold, starvation encirclement would
surely violate it. The first question, then, is whether the Oxford Guidance, the
ICRC, the U.N. General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, the Human
Rights Committee, and others are right to point to an arbitrariness threshold
to begin with.
Notably, upon their respective ratifications more than two decades after
the treaty was agreed, the United Kingdom and France both issued reservations stating that they do not consider Article 70 to apply to blockades.326
This supplemented a blockade exceptionalism in their interpretations of Article 54.327 The very fact that they felt compelled to issue reservations on the
issue indicates a considerable level of concern within those States that, absent a reservation, Article 70 would be applied in a way that would impose
substantive constraints on a State’s discretion to deny humanitarian access
in a hunger blockade. In short, it indicates recognition that there is a viable
interpretation that Article 70 does indeed impose limits on State discretion
here.
Watts rejects the Oxford Guidance on the grounds that it does not reflect
unambiguous shared intent among the drafters, has not been the dominant
understanding of Article 70, ignores a reading according to which “shall” has
meaning in defining the obligations that flow from having granted consent
(but not in limiting the discretion to withhold consent), and fails to explain
why the parties did not introduce clear language specifying a non-arbitrariness threshold if that is in fact what they wanted.328 He recognizes a diversity
322. Marcus, supra note 2, at 268 (decrying the arbitrariness standard as raising “the
troubling specter of ambiguity in the obligation to allow humanitarian assistance”).
323. AKANDE & GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 87, ¶¶ 43–54.
324. Id.
325. Id. ¶ 51; Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 771.
326. See supra note 185.
327. See supra note 178.
328. Watts, supra note 13, at 27–32.
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of State views on the issue and even suggests the final text reflected a certain
constructive ambiguity; however, his view is that such ambiguity should support only a narrow and constrained reading of any obligations on States.329
Whatever its force in responding to the claim that there is an arbitrariness
limit within the Article 70 framework, this line of argument cannot underpin
a claim of unfettered discretion on the part of the encircling power. IHL
rules are primarily prohibitive.330 Absent explicit and unequivocal direction
to the contrary, the failure of one rule to prohibit a particular action neither
creates an exception to another rule that does prohibit the action nor confers
on parties any kind of authority to engage in that action.
Article 70 (and the analogous provision in Article 18 of Protocol II) do
not confer any authority to abrogate the independent obligation not to use
starvation as a method of warfare. As discussed in the previous Section, that
independent obligation includes the duty not to cause starvation by using a
position of encirclement to block the passage of essential goods. This imposes an external and categorical limit on States’ discretion to withhold Article 70/18 consent.331 In other words, it imposes a limit that would hold
even if Watts were correct that the discretion to deny access is not limited
by the internal terms of Article 70 (or Article 18 of Protocol II). Thus, the
ICRC Commentary to Protocol II is correct to insist that the inadequate supply
of the civilian population can create scenarios in which “the international
relief actions provided for in Article 18 should be authorized to enable the obligation following from Article 14 to be respected.”332
Similarly, the Israeli Supreme Court has recognized that the customary
rules reflected in Articles 54 and 70 of Protocol I together lead to the prohibition of refusing “to allow the passage of foodstuffs and basic humanitarian
equipment necessary for the survival of the civilian population.”333 The requirement to allow humanitarian relief has been described as the “corollary”

329. Id. at 33–35.
330. ADIL AHMAD HAQUE, LAW AND MORALITY AT WAR 30 (2017).
331. This is why the French and British views that Article 54 does not apply to blockades due to the Article 49(3) caveat are an important corollary of their reservations to Article
70. See supra notes 178–185.
332. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 4798 (emphasis added).
333. HCJ 9132/07 Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed and others v. Prime Minister and Minister of Defence ¶ 14 (2008), http://www.hamoked.org/items/9862_eng.pdf (unofficial
translation) (Isr.).
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of the underlying starvation ban.334 And the Group of Experts on Yemen
has reasoned that the strict prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare
entails that in certain circumstances, “the provision of relief supplies has to
be allowed and facilitated.”335
This understanding of the prohibition of starvation would not render
Articles 70 of Protocol I and 18 of Protocol II redundant. First, Article 70
covers a broader array of scenarios than merely those involving the interaction between a besieging or blockading party and an encircled population. It
also defines the duty of a State to its own civilians in areas it controls.336 In
that sense, it covers instances in which the denial of humanitarian access
would not be a method of warfare, such that Article 54 would not be implicated. Second, the humanitarian access frameworks in those articles apply
whenever the civilian population is “inadequately supplied” or subject to
“undue hardship”—thresholds that may be understood to be lower than is
starvation (although here it would matter whether one understands the latter
to be an outcome or a process).337 It is in the space between inadequate supply and starvation that one might debate the questions of discretion and arbitrariness under Articles 70 and 18. The point here is that regardless of how
that debate is resolved, the rules articulated in Articles 54 and 14 preclude
encirclement starvation.
This, again, has implications for how to understand paragraphs 103–4 of
the San Remo Manual. The Manual’s Explanation asserts that those paragraphs
are more demanding than is Article 70 of Protocol I.338 This is true when
each provision is read in isolation. Paragraphs 103–4 do not appear to grant
the encircling power the kind of discretion that might be thought to flow
from Article 70 of Protocol I. However, when Article 70 is read together
with Article 54 and when paragraphs 103–4 are read together with paragraph
102, the analysis looks different. The permissiveness of paragraph 102 combines with the ambiguity in 103–4 regarding how to react to contexts in
which exclusive delivery to civilians cannot be guaranteed to provide a
334. Bartels, supra note 108, at 286. Arguing that Articles 54 and 70 must be read in
“conjunction with the . . . provisions [of Geneva Convention IV] prohibiting the starvation
of civilians as a method of warfare and those stating that intentional starvation, including
the impediment of relief supplies, is a war crime,” see Pejic, supra note 83, at 1103.
335. Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶ 738.
336. AKANDE & GILLARD, OXFORD GUIDANCE, supra note 87, ¶ 23.
337. Akande & Gillard, Conflict-induced Food Insecurity, supra note 72, at 760–61. See also
id. 775. On the process/outcome distinction, see supra notes 73–74, 283, 302–303 and accompanying text.
338. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 103.1.
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framework for the protection against starvation encirclement that is weaker
in certain respects than is the Additional Protocol I framework, given the
categorical ban in Article 54.
To be consistent with the demands of IHL, the obligations in paragraphs
103–4 should be clarified to leave no ambiguity that they are not contingent
on exclusive civilian delivery. Technical arrangements may be implemented
so as to maximize the likelihood that aid will reach civilians, but civilians
cannot be starved if those technical arrangements are insufficient to guarantee exclusive civilian use. Instead, these requirements ought to be understood
to entail a bright-line rule, requiring permission whenever its denial would
lead to starvation.
F. Allowing Civilians Out Does Not Justify Starving Those Who Remain
What, then, of the argument that a besieging party engages in no violation
vis-à-vis those that remain in starvation conditions in the encircled area, as
long as it allows those civilians who are willing and able to leave to do so?
This, too, is untenable under existing law. The duty to take all feasible precautions supplements belligerents’ other duties; it adds a layer of humanitarian protection. That function is perverted when the fact of having taken precautions is invoked to cloak the attenuation of other IHL protections. It is
clear that warning civilians in advance of an attack does not absolve the attacking force from responsibility for complying with the demands of distinction, discrimination, and proportionality in the course of the promised operation.339 Civilians do not become targets simply by failing to heed such a
warning, nor do they cease thereby to count in the proportionality analysis.340
There is no reason that the rule ought to be any different in the context of
encirclement warfare than it is in the context of any other scenario to which
precautionary obligations apply.
On the contrary, by the terms of Protocol I, the test for losing civilian
protection against starvation is the same as the test for whether a civilian has
lost protection against being the target of a kinetic attack—namely, whether
339. See, e.g., Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions), Paul Hunt (Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of
the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health), Walter Kälin (Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights Of Internally Displaced Persons), Miloon
Kothari (Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living), Mission to Lebanon and Israel, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/7 (Oct
2, 2006) [hereinafter Report of U.N. Special Rapporteurs].
340. Id.
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the person is participating directly in hostilities at the time of the attack. 341
Even if one takes the controversial view that voluntary human shields rise to
the level of direct participants in hostilities, it is implausible to hold that declining to leave one’s home could qualify a person as a voluntary human
shield and thereby a lawful target. Such a standard would eviscerate civilian
protection.342 For that reason, it is unsurprising that there is no contemporary
support for the view that civilians who stay voluntarily in a besieged area
thereby become lawful targets for sniping or bombardment.343 There is, by
extension, no basis for the claim that those civilians may be the targets of
starvation.344
Similarly, the mere fact that those civilians were offered a path out cannot transform the objects of which they have been deprived from essential
to non-essential for their survival. Indeed, even when the civilian population
does move in response to their deprivation of indispensable objects, this itself
is likely to implicate the encircling party in a violation. Article 54(3)(b) prohibits any deprivation of indispensable objects “expected to leave the civilian
population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or
force its movement.”345 It is hard to see how the infliction of siege conditions
with the offer of a path out would not qualify as forced movement in this
respect.346 Certainly, the fact that the deprivation serves a military objective
341. AP I, supra note 63, art. 51(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by
this Section [which includes Article 54], unless and for such time as they take a direct part
in hostilities.”). What surpasses the threshold for direct participation in hostilities is subject
to debate, with voluntary human shields falling into the zone of disagreement. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
56–57 (2009) (classifying voluntary human shields as direct participants in hostilities only
when they serve as a “physical obstacle” as opposed to a “legal obstacle”); HCJ 769/02
Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, 62(1) PD 507, ¶ 36
(2006) (Isr.), reprinted in 46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373 (classifying all voluntary
human shields as direct participants in hostilities).
342. Report of U.N. Special Rapporteurs, supra note 339, ¶ 41 (In the context of advance warnings: “A decision to stay put—freely taken or due to limited options—in no way
diminishes a civilian’s legal protections.”).
343. On the criminal sniping and bombardment of besieged civilians, see generally
Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
344. Provost, supra note 57, at 619; Gillard, supra note 145, at 12.
345. AP I, supra note 63, art. 54(3)(b) (emphasis added).
346. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 4812 (“To
deprive the civilian population of objects indispensable to its survival usually results in such
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is not itself sufficient to avoid that issue. The ban on forced movement in
Article 54(3)(b) attaches specifically to situations in which the deprivation of
the objects has a clear military benefit, and would, absent starvation or forced
movement, therefore be permissible.347
In some circumstances, the besieged party may itself bear responsibility
for failing to allow or manage the evacuation of the civilians under its control.348 Depending on the conditions, that failure could amount to a violation
of its passive precautionary obligations to “endeavour to remove the civilian
population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from
the vicinity of military objectives” and to take “other necessary precautions
to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations.” 349
Perhaps in certain circumstances, the besieged party’s refusal to let civilians
leave would be deemed a deliberate effort to use the civilian population to
render legitimate military objectives immune from attack.350 In others, the
besieged party might prohibit exit with a view to exploiting the ensuing civilian suffering for publicity, as part of a lawfare campaign.351 However,
whether classified as a breach of passive precautionary duties or as a use of
human shields, violations of this kind by the besieged party would have no
bearing on the duties of the besieging state vis-à-vis those who remain.352 At
most, it would mean that the wrong inflicted on the civilians that were held
back would be the shared responsibility of the besieging and the besieged
parties.353
In short, in the context of encirclement warfare, the protection of civilians from starvation is a categorical bright line. Articles 54 and 14 allow of
a population moving elsewhere as it has no other recourse than to flee. Such movements
are provoked by the use of starvation, which is in such cases equivalent to the use of force.”);
see also Riordan, supra note 173, at 172; Gillard, supra note 145, at 13. Of course, if humanitarian delivery were impossible, evacuation may be the only option. COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, ¶ 2096.
347. AP I, supra note 63, art. 54(3)(b).
348. Conley & de Waal, supra note 73, at 709 (noting that the willingness to stay and
level of solidarity with the besieged combatants will often vary considerably across the civilian population).
349. AP I, supra note 63, art. 58.
350. Id. art. 51(7).
351. ‘It Is Necessary That Those Who Are Responsible for These Famines Fear That They Could
Be Prosecuted for Their Crimes’: An interview with Jane Ferguson, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 907, 909 (2019).
352. Gillard, supra note 145, at 8.
353. AP I, supra note 63, art. 51(8).
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no exception. The ban on starvation functions prior to considerations of
proportionality and precautions and cannot be overridden by them. It applies
even when the besieging party would allow civilians to leave.
G. Necessity
Whether encirclement starvation is a particularly effective way of engaging a
besieged or blockaded enemy is open to debate.354 However, even assuming
that starvation may serve valuable military purposes in certain contexts, that
alone would not be sufficient to debunk a categorical interpretation of the
ban. Today’s law of armed conflict is not simply subordinate to military necessity.355 It includes a range of categorical prohibitions that hold irrespective
of the potential military advantage associated with their violation. One of
those is the protection of both individual civilians and the civilian population
from attack. The weaker party in an asymmetric conflict may stand to gain
militarily by attacking the enemy’s civilian population, seeking to exploit their
vulnerability to coerce withdrawal or compliance.356 Indeed, for some actors,
doing so may be the only plausible route to military success. From the legal
point of view, however, this imperative is irrelevant. The targeting of civilians
who are not participating directly in hostilities is categorically ruled out. 357
The arguments offered in defense of allied “terror bombing” in World War
II are clearly legally unavailable today.358 Whether or not they are the most
effective means available, besieging forces may not employ weapons that
cannot be directed at a specific military objective.359

354. Mark Lattimer, Can Incidental Starvation of Civilians be Lawful under IHL?, EJIL:TALK!
(Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/can-incidental-starvation-of-civilians-be-lawfulunder-ihl/.
355. Historically, necessity was closer to being a normative wild card in the law of armed
conflict. See, e.g., WITT, supra note 16, at 4, 183. However, in the contemporary law of armed
conflict, this is no longer the case. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note
149, at 10–12.
356. ROBERT PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM
chs. 3, 6 (2005).
357. AP I, supra note 63, art. 51(2).
358. WALZER, supra note 234, ch. 16.
359. Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 461–63, 472 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A,
Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 247–52 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2008); 2
INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA
338–43 (2009); Kraska, supra note 217, ¶ 13.
382

Encircling, Deprivation, and Humanity

Vol. 97

Similarly, efforts to justify the use of torture on necessity grounds have
(with rare and highly controversial exceptions) failed to gain legal acceptance,
despite torture advocates’ repeated invocation of the practice’s alleged benefits. Aharon Barak wrote famously on behalf of the Israeli Supreme Court
that a law-abiding State (or, in his words, a democracy) “must often fight
with one hand tied behind its back.”360 The decision in which he made that
claim has been criticized persuasively as itself providing more of a legitimation function than a constraining one.361 Nonetheless, Barak was correct in
his observation that compliance with the law of armed conflict does not
guarantee the adoption of any means or method that would return a military
advantage.
Not only would encirclement starvation be anomalous in a regime that
requires the infliction of death and suffering to be discriminate and targeted,
it would be a striking anomaly, given the torturous suffering it entails. Although it would certainly complicate the use of siege and blockade warfare,362
the interpretation advanced here would not leave the commander bereft of
tools by which to engage the adversary.363 Blockades of States that are minimally dependent on maritime trade for essential items or where an effective
channel for a robust supply of essentials can be maintained would not necessarily fall afoul of the prohibition.364 The interdiction of contraband would
360. HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel 53(4) PD 817, ¶ 39
(1999) (Isr.).
361. See, e.g., Itamar Mann & Omer Shatz, The Necessity Procedure: Laws of Torture in Israel
and Beyond, 1987–2009, 6 UNBOUND: HARVARD JOURNAL OF THE LEGAL LEFT (2010). That
critique has now been confirmed, as the Supreme Court seems to have untied the State’s
hand completely. HCJ 9018/17 Tbeish & Public Committee against Torture in Israel v.
Attorney General (2018) (Isr.), https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/
opinions/Tbeish%20v.%20Attorney%20General.pdf (unofficial translation).
362. Indicating the incompatibility between the Additional Protocol I rules (at least on
the interpretation suggested here) and siege warfare, see, e.g., DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES, supra note 149, at 255; William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a
Punishable Offense, 7 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAl LAW 539, 557
(1997); Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides that it is prohibited to use starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare, cited in 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 89, r. 53, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter17_rule53.
363. Riordan, supra note 173, at 178.
364. This was how the Israeli High Court of Justice evaluated the situation in Gaza in
2008. HCJ 9132/07 Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed and others v. Prime Minister and Minister
of Defence ¶ 22 (2008), http://www.hamoked.org/items/9862_eng.pdf (unofficial translation) (Isr.). See also TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶¶ 73, 76.
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remain lawful even if humanitarian constraints were to preclude the imposition of a blockade.365 And partial isolation and targeted operations against
military targets can be effective in lieu of a comprehensive encirclement. 366
Encirclement without deprivation can also be useful as a means by which to
contain enemy forces within an area, thus precluding their deployment elsewhere.367
It is also worth noting that blockades are available only when States can
enforce them comprehensively, so they are off the table for many belligerents regardless of starvation-specific restrictions.368 This efficacy requirement is not ordinarily critiqued as a reason that the existing rules do not
properly respond to military necessity, despite the fact that the States thus
precluded from adopting encirclement tactics are (almost by definition) less
able to draw on other resources to pursue their mission. Military necessity
arguments that dispute humanitarian constraints that would limit the actions
of powerful belligerents but leave unchallenged constraints that limit the actions of weaker belligerents ought to be treated with some skepticism.
H. Reforming the San Remo Manual on Blockades and Starvation
In sum, the San Remo Manual falls short of the Additional Protocol I standard
of humanitarian protections in encirclement blockades because its combined
rules do not clearly and unequivocally prohibit blockades that cause civilian
starvation, whether as a non-exclusive purpose, as the predicate purpose to
starving combatants within the encircled area into submission, or (on a
broader reading of the Protocol I prohibition) as the collateral effect of any
other deprivation of objects essential to civilian survival. The introduction
of a proportionality rule as the safeguard in the San Remo Manual cannot fully
365. SCHMITT, supra note 252, at 3; Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, supra note 90, ¶
2. Indeed, the significant feature of a blockade is that it “avoids the need to distinguish
between the cargoes carried by neutral ships, and so overrides the law of contraband.” 2
DANIEL P. O’CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1150 (1984). As a matter
of policy (rather than opinio juris) in the land context, it is worth noting here the Turkel
Commission’s framing of an Israeli policy change in 2010. TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 133, ¶ 97 (“[I]t should be noted that in June 2010, the Israeli Government changed
the land border crossings policy from a policy in which only the transfer of limited humanitarian supplies was allowed to a policy where only the entry of goods that have military
purposes is prohibited.”).
366. Lattimer, supra note 354.
367. Gillard, supra note 145, at 2.
368. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 95; Declaration of London, supra note 24, art. 3; Paris Declaration, supra note 25, principle 4.
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cover those gaps. Indeed, a crucial feature of Article 54 of Protocol I is to
place a categorical ban on the starvation of civilians—to prohibit it regardless
of the military advantage that might accrue, just as IHL prohibits the targeting or terrorizing of civilians, the torture of detainees, or the indiscriminate
bombardment of areas of dense civilian population, irrespective of the military advantage such actions may promise.
The legal principles enshrined in the Additional Protocols have been
confirmed in important developments since the publication of the San Remo
Manual. As discussed above, they underpin the war crimes provisions of the
Rome Statute.369 They have been seized upon regularly in response to the
deprivations that have characterized the situations in Syria, South Sudan,
Yemen, and elsewhere.370 The Security Council and other U.N. bodies have
repeatedly condemned the use of starvation as a method of warfare, including by denying humanitarian access.371 Although not all of these developments point unequivocally to a particular interpretation of the Additional
Protocols, they do contribute to the customary law credentials of the core
rules.
In light of this, the San Remo Manual should be revised in several respects.
Paragraph 102(a) should incorporate the categorical ban on starvation. It
might read: “The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if
it has the purpose or foreseeable consequence of starving the civilian population by depriving it of objects essential for its survival.”
On the issue of proportionality (currently included in paragraph 102(b)),
the text can be retained, but three things ought to be clarified in the revised
Explanation. First, the document should specify the basis for the inclusion
of a proportionality rule and explain why that basis would not also demand
incorporating rules of discrimination and general precautions. Second, the
Explanation should examine the question of how proportionality is to be
evaluated over time, particularly as civilian harm or military advantage deviates from initial expectations, whether that entails adopting a prospective,
369. See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.
370. Group of Experts on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶¶ 358, 511, 737–50; Commission on
Human Rights in South Sudan, supra note 116. Then-U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
warned that the siege tactics used against the populations of Madaya and other encircled
areas in Syria were potentially criminal. Starvation ‘as a Weapon’ is a War Crime, UN Chief Warns
Parties to Conflict in Syria, UN NEWS (Jan. 14, 2016) https://news.un.org/
en/story/2016/01/519982-starvation-weapon-war-crime-un-chief-warns-parties-conflictsyria.
371. S.C. Res. 2258, pmbl., para. 4 (Dec. 22, 2015); H.R. Council Res. 26/23, ¶ 7 (July
17, 2014); S.C. Res. 2417, pmbl., paras. 5, 6, 10 (May 24, 2018).
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quota, or discount approach.372 Third, it should be clarified that the proportionality rule is included as a supplement to the categorical ban on starvation,
rather than as its replacement. In other words, it should be clear that the
proportionality constraint is relevant primarily to civilian suffering caused by
factors other than the deprivation of essential objects, such that no assessment of military advantage would legitimate the latter.373
Paragraph 103 should be framed to specify that any imposition of technical arrangements or supervision conditions cannot impede humanitarian
access to the point of causing the starvation of civilians, even if that means
that essential objects allowed through cannot be guaranteed to benefit the
civilian population exclusively. That could entail adding the following at the
end of the provision: “In no case shall the imposition of technical arrangements or conditions on the distribution of essential supplies impede the delivery of such supplies to the point of causing the starvation of civilians.”
A similar clarification should be added to the technical arrangements
provision of paragraph 104. Even if the existing text of these two provisions
were to be retained, the proper interpretation could be clarified in the Explanation.
VI.

BEYOND BLOCKADE: TWO NORMATIVE TRENDS THAT CANNOT
BE IGNORED IN THE SAN REMO UPDATE

Before closing, it is worth noting two broader dimensions of normative
change since the Manual’s publication that have particularly significant implications for the revision process, both at the level of the encirclement provisions, but also across the document as a whole. The first is the extension by
custom of many IHL rules to the realm of NIACs. The second is the growing
recognition and elaboration of the role of IHRL in armed conflict.

372. See supra notes 158-162 and accompanying text.
373. International Fact-Finding Mission, supra note 133, ¶ 52 (“the damage may be
thought of as the destruction of the civilian economy and prevention of reconstruction further to damage”); Cf. TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶ 90 (“the ‘damage’ or
‘suffering’ discussed in international humanitarian law are mainly those that are identified in
the prohibitions of starvation and deprivation of objects essential for the survival of the
civilian population”).
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A. The Law of Armed Conflict for NIACs
In the opening paragraphs of the San Remo Manual’s Explanation, the authors
write, “although the provisions of this Manual are primarily meant to apply
to international armed conflict at sea, this has intentionally not been expressly indicated in paragraph 1 in order not to dissuade the implementation
of these rules in non-international armed conflicts involving naval operations.”374 The Turkel Commission took this language to support application
of the Manual’s rules (including on blockades) to NIACs.375 Predictably, that
interpretation has been criticized as straightforwardly inconsistent with the
text upon which it relies.376 Indeed, it seems fairly clear that the Manual takes
no position on whether or not any of the specific rules it articulates have
customary or even emerging status in NIACs.
Just sixteen months after the Manual’s provisions were initially adopted,
the Appeals Chamber of the fledgling International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia ruled that many (though not all) rules of IHL apply
to NIACs as a matter of custom, even though most treaty provisions focus
exclusively on IACs.377 Famously, the chamber complemented a survey of
State practice and opinio juris on the issue with the more normative observation that “what is inhumane in international war cannot but be inhumane
and consequently prohibited in civil strife.”378 Regardless of one’s view of
the soundness of the Tribunal’s legal determination in 1995, it is now the
dominant view among IHL experts. The Tadić decision has become one of
the most cited judicial interventions in the history of international law.379
A decade later, the ICRC released what remains the most comprehensive
single study of customary IHL.380 Confirming the thrust of the Tadić decision,
it determined that the overwhelming majority of IHL rules apply to both
NIACs and IACs. The study was not intended to cover naval warfare, but
its identification of a trend in IHL towards the comprehensive regulation of

374. SRM, supra note 10, ¶ 1.1.
375. TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶ 42.
376. Buchan, supra note 155, at 268.
377. Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 120, ¶¶ 96–127.
378. Id. ¶ 119.
379. Consider, for example, its prominence in the word clouds for U.S. and UK international law textbooks in ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL?
148–49 (2017).
380. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 70; 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 89.
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NIACs has implications beyond the intended scope of the study.381 The
ICRC’s methodology has been subject to much scrutiny,382 but the NIAC
trend is one that has gained widespread recognition. One year later, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law built on the success of the San
Remo Manual on armed conflicts at sea by publishing a Manual on the Law of
Non-International Armed Conflict, which also endorses the theory of significant
convergence in the law applicable to IACs and NIACs. 383 The latter Manual
does not articulate any specific limitation as to the domains to which it applies. It addresses free-floating naval mines and duties to the shipwrecked
but says nothing on a range of other issues specific to naval warfare.384 As
noted above, the war crimes code incorporated into the ICC Statute incorporates many of the key IAC war crimes in its NIAC list (now including
starvation) and does not exclude naval warfare.385
In light of these intervening developments, the revised Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea cannot credibly replicate
the first edition’s avoidance of the NIAC question. What a review of that
issue will mean for the blockade provisions is not clear, as blockade law is
one of the remaining issues on which there remains significant support for
the view that it is limited to IACs.386 This, however, only underscores the
inadequacy of the San Remo Manual’s consignment of the starvation prohibition to its blockade law framework. As a result of that approach, the Manual
fails to address other potentially significant forms of naval starvation warfare, particularly, though not exclusively, in NIACs. This flies in the face of
the clear basis in treaty and custom for the application of the ban on starvation of civilians as a method of warfare in all forms of armed conflict, regardless of whether the method of warfare in question qualifies as a blockade.
381. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 70, at xxxvi.
382. See, e.g., Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 97. For a broader array of perspectives on
the study, see ELIZABETH WILMSHURST & SUSAN BREAU, PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC
STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2007).
383. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON THE
LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (Michael N. Schmitt, Charles H. B. Garaway & Yoram Dinstein eds., 2006).
384. Id. at 30, 46–47.
385. See supra notes 106-123, 248–254 and accompanying text.
386. TURKISH NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, supra note 157, at 61–63; Fink,
supra note 3, at 303–4; Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockades and Interdiction, supra note 126, at
932. But see TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 133, ¶¶ 39–44. The Palmer Report
was particularly ambiguous on this issue. See Palmer Report, supra note 133, ¶ 73.
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The implications for the Manual of the rise of customary IHL in NIACs
in the quarter-century since the first edition are wide-ranging. On the specific
issue at hand here, if the revised manual finds sufficient customary basis for
the application of blockade law to NIACs, the application of paragraphs
102–4 to the latter context ought to be made explicit. Additionally, and regardless of whether the Group of Experts determines that blockade law applies in NIACs, the revised manual ought to clarify that the prohibition of
starvation of civilians as a method of warfare applies to all naval methods of
warfare in both IACs and NIACs, and not only to blockades. In evaluating
whether measures such as those imposed by the Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition on Yemen violate the starvation ban, the question should be whether
those measures constitute the infliction of starvation as a method of warfare,
not whether the action is a blockade, or whether the armed conflict is international or non-international.
B. International Human Rights Law and Armed Conflict
A second development has equally wide-ranging implications. The San Remo
Manual was framed not as a restatement of the law of armed conflict applicable at sea, but as a restatement of “international law applicable to armed
conflicts at sea.” Thus, the Manual incorporates rules from the jus ad bellum
and the law of neutrality, as well as rules of IHL. 387 Reading the text today,
however, there is a prominent omission. In the quarter-century since the
Manual’s publication, longstanding grounds for asserting the applicability of
IHRL to State conduct in armed conflict have gained traction with a broad
range of relevant legal authorities, including the International Court of Justice, the European, Inter-American, and African human rights courts, the
Human Rights Committee, and others.388 Most States have now recognized
387. See, e.g., SRM, supra note 10, pts. I–II.
388. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
Rep. 136, ¶¶ 105–6 (July 9); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8); Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70, ¶ 207 (Nov. 25, 2000); Coard v. United States of America,
Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/ser.L/V/II.106. doc.3rev
¶ 37 (1999); Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Amer. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 158 (1997); General Comment No. 3 on the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Life (Article 4), ¶¶ 7, 13, 20
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the applicability of human rights law in armed conflict, and even those that
have been resistant to this trend have equivocated in that respect.389 Notably,
the Security Council has also invoked human rights in armed conflict situations regularly in the period since the San Remo Manual was published.390
Of course, precisely how the regimes of IHRL and IHL are to interact
when both apply remains the subject of significant debate and has not always
been addressed consistently within the jurisprudence of individual courts or
other interpretive authorities. Some hold that both regimes apply unless they
diverge in their requirements, in which case IHL applies as the armed-conflict-specific interpretation of IHRL (the lex specialis).391 Alternatively, other
(Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=10 [hereinafter General Comment No. 3]; Hassan v. United Kingdom, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶¶ 77 104;
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), ¶¶ 3, 16,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001); Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment 31]; U.N Human Rights Committee, General Comment 36 (2018)
on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the Right to Life,
¶¶ 2, 64, 67, 70, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018). Note, however, that immediately before this article went to press, the European Court of Human Rights appeared to
narrow the degree to which the European Convention on Human Rights can apply extraterritorially in IACs. Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, ¶¶ 128–44 (2021) (ECtHR),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/GC_Judgment_20210121_ENG.PDF.
389. Most States have recognized the applicability of human rights law in armed conflict
for some time now. Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and
International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 310, 324
(2007). For the equivocation of those that have resisted, see, e.g., Fourth Periodic Report
of the United States to the Human Rights Committee ¶¶ 506–7 (Dec. 30, 2011); HCJ 769/02
Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, 62(1) PD 507, ¶ 38
(2006) (Isr.), reprinted in 46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373 (relying on human
rights law principles in the course of an IHL analysis).
390. For just a few such examples over the course of the last twenty-five years, see S.C.
Res. 1019 (Nov. 9, 1995); S.C. Res. 1034 (Dec. 21, 1995); S.C. Res. 1635 (Oct. 28, 2005);
S.C. Res. 1653 (Jan. 27, 2006), S.C. Res. 2511 (Feb. 25, 2020).
391. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶¶ 25,
35; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 106; Coard, Report
No. 109/99, OEA/ser.L/V/II.106. doc.3rev ¶ 42; Inter-Am. Commission H.R., Report on
Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 corr. ¶ 61 (2002); Letter
from Inter-Am. Commission H.R. to the United States, Detainees in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba: Request for Precautionary Measures (Mar. 13, 2002), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/
cases/guantanamo-2003.html. But see Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Resolution 2/11 Regarding
the
Situation
of
the
Detainees
at
Guantanamo
(July
22, 2011),
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authorities approach the issue along the lines defined in Article 31(3)(c) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides for different
treaties to be interpreted in light of one another, with neither in a position
of presumptive priority.392 On that approach, divergent rules may be harmonized through a hybrid, coordinated interpretation. 393 In still other instances,
bodies with human rights authority have applied human rights law straightforwardly in circumstances of armed conflict, regardless of potentially divergent rules of IHL, unless there is a direct contradiction (as when the latter
would require the violation of the former).394
Beyond that core issue of interpretative interaction are further layers of
complexity and uncertainty. For example, debates regarding the degree to
which IHL is facilitative or prohibitive have implications for the extent to
which the law of armed conflict is in tension with IHRL on any given issue
in the first place.395 Additionally, there is the longstanding issue of any particular human rights regime’s applicability to State conduct outside the latter’s territory. A State’s flag vessels are relatively straightforwardly included
https://www.cidh.oas.org/pdf%20files/Resolution%202-11%20Guantanamo.pdf (“Although international humanitarian law is the lex specialis for determining states’ obligations in
these situations, in certain circumstances, its norms may not provide sufficient protection
for the rights of the persons affected.”).
392. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 246, art. 31(3)(c).
393. See, e.g., Hassan v. United Kingdom, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 102; Inter-state
Petition IP-02 Admissibility Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina (Ecuador-Colombia), InterAm. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 112/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140, doc. 10 ¶¶ 121–22 (2011)
(invoking both the Vienna Convention principle and lex specialis); Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70, ¶ 207 (Nov. 25, 2000) (“the relevant
provisions of the Geneva Conventions may be taken into consideration as elements for the
interpretation of the American Convention”); Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary
Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, ¶ 179 (July
1, 2006); General Comment No. 3, supra note 388, ¶¶ 13, 32–35; General Comment 31, supra
note 388, ¶ 11. Having invoked the lex specialis concept previously, the International Court
of Justice in Armed Activities took a more equivocal line, citing those earlier cases only for
the proposition that “both branches of international law, namely international human rights
law and international humanitarian law, would have to be taken into consideration.” Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005
I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19).
394. See, e.g., Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 305, ¶ 107 (holding
that even if the situation at hand had been an IAC (which would have implicated the IHL
detention regime), the European Convention detention standard would apply as usual, unless IHL specifically required its violation).
395. HAQUE, supra note 330, at 30. Cf. Eliav Lieblich, The Facilitative Function of Jus in
Bello, 30 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (2019).
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within its sphere of human rights responsibility, as are persons held in detention by its agents.396 More complex, however, are questions regarding the
application of human rights law to State acts or omissions vis-à-vis persons
not on one of its flagged vessels, but who are affected by decisions made by
those who control those vessels. The precise threshold at which human
rights protections kick in in such circumstances is not uniform across regimes.397 How it applies in the context of economic and social rights is particularly unclear, notwithstanding the fact that the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has no territorial jurisdictional
clause and even requires “international assistance and co-operation” in the
progressive realization of the rights enshrined.398
Assuming territorial application, deprivation by encirclement raises significant issues for the rights to life, food (and freedom from hunger), health,
and possibly torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, housing,
and freedom of movement, among others.399 Without providing specifics,
the Security Council’s landmark resolution on starvation in armed conflict
invokes IHRL twice alongside IHL, including by demanding that “all parties

396. The reach of a State’s human rights duties to its flagged vessels was recognized
even in the European Court of Human Rights’ most restrictive (and since overturned) decision on the extraterritorial application of the European Convention. Bankovic and Others
v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 73. On detention, see, e.g., Al-Skeini v. United
Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, ¶ 88 (citing Lord Brown’s determination in the House
of Lords’ decision in the case that detention was one of the narrow bases for extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the Banković era).
397. See generally MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011). The European regime has been
perhaps the most inconsistent on this issue. Compare, e.g., Bankovic, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.
333, ¶¶ 59–82, and Al-Skeini, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, ¶¶ 130–42, with Jaloud v. Netherlands, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 229, ¶¶ 137–53.
398. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966); GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Malcolm
Langford, Wouter Vandenhole, Martin Scheinin & Wilem van Genugten, eds., 2013); UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS (Mark Gibney & Sigrun
I. Skogly eds., 2010).
399. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic, ¶ 82, U.N Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011); Group of Experts
on Yemen, supra note 5, ¶¶ 81–85, 747, 800–809; Ventura, supra note 71, at 783; Simone
Hutter, Starvation in Armed Conflicts: An Analysis Based on the Right to Food, 17 JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 723 (2019).
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to armed conflicts fully comply with their obligations under international
law, including international human rights law, as applicable.”400
Whether or not the San Remo revision can fully explore how to think
about specific human rights in the context of a blockade,401 the new manual
will need to confront the general mechanics of the interaction between human rights law and humanitarian law and to articulate some overarching
principles on the specific complexities of the application of human rights law
at sea. The drafters could, of course, choose to define the manual’s scope in
a more restrictive way than they did in 1994, focusing exclusively on the law
of armed conflict, rather than international law applicable to armed conflicts
at sea. However, doing so would deviate from the original framing and reduce the new manual’s utility, given that these challenges are central to the
contemporary legal environment.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The lack of any comprehensive treaty on the law of armed conflict at sea
remains a major gap in existing IHL. Given that void and the unique features
of naval warfare, the San Remo Manual has tremendous importance as the
most prominent and widely read restatement of the law in that domain.
Much of its text is replicated in military manuals around the world. Its revision offers an important opportunity to update it to accommodate both technological and legal developments. It also offers an opportunity to reflect
upon and revisit the original draft on its own terms.
That reflection ought to lead to a revision of the provisions on blockade
and a more comprehensive incorporation of the prohibition of the starvation
of civilians as a method of warfare. The introduction of humanitarian protections into the law of blockade in the text agreed in 1994 was an important
step. However, it did not reach as far as the law of the time, and it falls short
of the legal posture on starvation today. Amending that in the revision and
clarifying both that the prohibition applies to naval methods of warfare other
than blockade and that there is an equivalent restriction in NIACs ought to
400. S.C. Res 2417, pmbl., para. 2 (May 24, 2018).
401. Adopting a lex specialis approach, see, e.g., TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
133, ¶¶ 98–100. Arguing that ultimate limits of IHRL must constrain any interpretation of
IHL here, see Coco, Hemptinne & Lander, supra note 289, at 917 (“Any interpretation of
the law of armed conflict should be acceptable only insofar as it allows protection for the
minimum core of the right to food, which would definitely include the right to be free (and
not die) from hunger”).
393

International Law Studies

2021

have high priority in the Manual’s revision. The group of experts preparing
the revision must also consider how and with what degree of detail to engage
with human rights law, which could itself have significant implications for
blockades and other encirclements.
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